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ABSTRACT
On 01 July, 1997, Hong Kong will revert back from British rule to
Chinese sovereignty, becoming a Special Administrative Region (SAR)
under the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.
The United States and its citizens have a tremendous investment in the
British colony that could be placed at risk by the change in sovereignty.
This thesis reviews the development of United States' interest in the
colony and defines the current interests in the colony. The retrocession
developments are then examined as are the current attempts to modify the
Basic Law or "mini-constitution" for Hong Kong. Alternative scenarios are
suggested for post-1997 Hong Kong. The thesis is optimistic about the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and about the United States'
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On 01 July, 1997, Hong Kong will revert from British rule back to
Chinese sovereignty, becoming a Special Administrative Region (SAR)
under the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.
The return to Chinese sovereignty has caused some concern over the
safety of Americans living in Hong Kong as well as for United States'
businesses that have investments in the colony.
Chapter II reviews the historical development of United States'
interests in Hong Kong. The current relationship is a product of long
association from participation in the opium trade in China, the missionary
movement attempting to spread Christianity, through World War II till the
present.
The foundation of American policy in Hong Kong is the protection of
United States' economic and commercial interests. Chapter III examines
United States' concerns and interests in Hong Kong. According to the State
Department, they are: (1) assurance of a smooth transition from British to
Chinese sovereignty, (2) protection of human rights, (3) democratic
development, and (4) strengthening relations between the United States
and Hong Kong.
Chapter IV looks at the process of retrocession, including a review
of the Joint Declaration which established the timetable for the turnover
of the colony and the ambiguous Basic Law or "mini-constitution" of Hong
Kong. Also examined are the attempts by Hong Kong Governor Christopher
Patten to modify the Basic Law.
Chapter V suggests possible scenarios of development after 1997,
including the course of American-Chinese relations. A worst and best
case scenario are presented, with the most likely scenario involving a
combination of conflicting interests and cooperation between the two
countries with Hong Kong flourishing as China's markets expand under its
reform program.
The thesis concludes by arguing that Hong Kong no longer holds the
important position it once did for the United States, that of "listening
post" for China. It also suggests that Hong Kong is no longer necessary as
a base of operations for American businesses interested in participating
in the Chinese market. Foreign capital and technology are being welcomed
directly into China, with foreign businesses setting up shop throughout
the country. American companies are participating in one of the world's
fastest growing economy with the full support of the government of China.
China's goal for itself and Hong Kong include stability, growth,
peace, and prosperity; these are goals that should serve Hong Kong and the
rest of the world quite well.
VI
A. INTRODUCTION
On 01 July, 1997, Hong Kong will revert back from British rule to
Chinese sovereignty, becoming a Special Administrative Region (SAR)
under the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.
China was once the most advanced civilization in the world,
contemporary with and larger than the Roman Empire Albert Feuerwerker,
an economic historian, states that from 1000 to 1500 AD "no comparison
of agricultural productivity, industrial skill, commercial complexity,
urban wealth, or standard of living (not to mention bureaucratic
sophistication and cultural achievement) would place Europe on a par with
the Chinese empire" (in Ropp 1990). 1 Today, however, China faces many
problems. With over a billion people and a struggling but growing
economy, the issue of Hong Kong has become a sensitive one for China.
Never having recognized the colonial status of Hong Kong under British
sovereignty, the Chinese have challenged the British claim over the years.
Having been unsuccessful in their attempts to regain the territory, little
thought was given by the mighty Chinese to the tiny colony.
Hong Kong has since grown in importance to China. Much of China's
economic reform policies will either succeed or fail because of Hong Kong.
As China makes a bid for hosting the Olympic games and continues its push
for a 'Greater China', to include Taiwan, Chinese officials know the world
is watching events in Hong Kong.
China has invested over $16 billion in Hong Kong in a variety of
companies, and more than forty percent of China's trade passes through
Hong Kong. Ironically, the increased emphasis on market economics within
China, combined with the collapse of the Soviet Union, ties the survival of
the world's last, major communist system on successful integration with
the dynamic economies of other Asian-Pacific countries.
Hong Kong, too, has investment in China, with two-thirds of the
foreign investment in China coming from Hong Kong. There are more than
1 John King Fairbank, China A New History
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1992), 2.
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25,000 Hong Kong-backed factories in Guangdong province alone,
employing three million workers. In Guangdong, Hong Kong currency not
only circulates freely, but is the preferred currency. The economic
prosperity of both Hong Kong and China are virtually intertwined.
This thesis begins with a review of the historical development of
the United States' interest in China and Hong Kong. Americans were deeply
involved in the opium trade and the opium wars which led to the ceding of
Hong Kong to the British. The Opium War was less about opium and more
about the conflict between Eastern and Western cultures, and the clash
between conceptions of international order, economics, and legal
institutions. That clash is now approaching its denouement with the
retrocession of Hong Kong, and American interests are more deeply
involved than ever. The Boxer Rebellion, World War II, and the post World
War II period only served to tighten the historic relationship between the
United States and China.
The United States' current concerns and interests in Hong Kong, as
promulgated by the United States Department of State, are: (1) assuring
the smooth transition from British to Chinese sovereignty, (2) protection
of human rights, (3) democratic development, and (4) strengthening the
relationship between the United States and Hong Kong. The underlying
obligation of American policy is to safeguard the economic and
commercial interest of the United States, and its citizens, in Hong Kong.
The retrocession of Hong Kong will be discussed in terms of both the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. and the current attempts by
Christopher Patten, the Governor of Hong Kong, to modify the Basic Law.
This thesis will examine procedures and events that have taken
place and are expected to take place between the original Sino-British
agreement of 1984 and the actual retrocession scheduled for 1997. Each
basic step will be analyzed for its possible effect on United States'
interests in Hong Kong. The current attempts by Christopher Patten to
modify the Basic Law are by no means the end of the road. Without any
pretense of forecasting the course of events, this thesis suggests
alternative scenarios of development after 1997. The fate of the people
of Hong Kong is at stake, as is the prosperity of China. But so far as
Americans are concerned, the problem for the government of the United
States is to safeguard the interests of Americans whatever arrangements
the Chinese may make for the future of the former British colony.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. INTEREST IN HONG KONG
In order to explore the relationship the United States currently has
with Hong Kong, one must look first at the history of that relationship.
American and British traders, missionaries, and naval officers were
inseparably linked in the early trade and diplomacy on the China coast. It
is sufficient to review the facts as described by John King Fairbank in
Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast and China , by Arthur Power
Dudden, in his work, The American Pacific , and by G. B. Endacott in his
informative A History of Hong Kong .
A. ROOTS IN THE OPIUM TRADE
To import opium into China in the latter days of the empire was
illegal, but, in the 1800's, opium was produced in large quantities and sold
at auction in India, under British auspices. It was then taken to China by
private traders, both British and Indian, who had been licensed by the East
India Company which governed India. The sale of opium at Guangzhou
bought tea which was then sent to England; this established the third leg
of the infamous India-China-England triangle trade.
Americans also participated in this opium trade with China. Visions
of China's limitless markets brought American traders to Canton. Second
only to the British traders in the number of ships in Canton, these new
American entrepreneurs were admitted by the Chinese since they spoke
the same language as the British traders. Also, they came as private
individuals with no government officials to complicate processes already
in place. Originally, it was the trade of furs (sea otters and beaver pelts
obtained from the Indians of the northwest United States) that were
traded by Americans in China. Americans soon became involved in the
opium trade to take advantage of the tremendous profits that the British
were realizing. The British had more of the market of the Indian opium
tied up, so American traders, brought Turkish opium from Smyrna into
Canton. The trade from Turkey was smaller and not as profitable, but
profits were substantial. Some Americans soon linked up with British in
the Indian trade.
Large amounts of silver were used for commercial transactions in
the opium trade. Since silver was not produced in large quantities within
China. The silver was obtained from the galleon trade with Mexico and
served as the basis for the currency used by the Qing administration. Its
use in the opium trade threatened the supply, so the opium problem
became a fiscal problem that threatened the revenues of the government.
(The silver used in opium trade may not have "drained" the country. In
most cases, the silver payments were turned around and used for purchase
of silk and/or tea. It may just have been a shift in the balance of trade
for China, and possible hoarding, that caused the apparent shortage of
silver within the country.)
In 1834, the East India Company's monolopy of British trade to China
ended. A British official, a naval officer, was sent to China to oversee
British trade. The presence of this foreign official concerned the Chinese
government as much as the opium trade itself. Lord Napier arrived as
chief superintendent of British trade in China, three months after the
Company's charter had expired. British trade stopped three weeks after
his arrival. He was ordered to administer British law, but the Chinese had
not given permission for this. Since Napier had limited authority outside
Canton, it was only a matter of time before conflicts occurred.
The system of trade that had been in place between the Westerners
and the Chinese, the Guangzhou system, had the East India Company dealing
with brokers called Hong merchants (a member of the authorized
Cantonese merchant guild) who handled trade ship-by-ship and collected
duty payments and fees. With the end of the monolopy by the East India
Company, British private traders continued to export teas and silks as
well as to import opium. Lord Napier demanded to deal with Qing officials
in terms of diplomatic equality rather than deal like a trader with the
Hong merchants. This went against the tribute system that was in place
in China. If Britain's diplomatic equality was recognized, the concept that
the Chinese emperor was superior to all other rulers would be destroyed,
and it was this system that rationalized the emperor's position in power
in China. If the opium trade was allowed to continue, the problem of
silver depletion would shake the foundation of the government of China.
Besides the trade in opium, American traders supplied grain, cheese,
rum, ironware. These products were not sufficient to pay for the teas,
cotton, silk, lacquerware, and porcelain that the Chinese had, unless,
augmented with kegs of Mexican silver. For the American traders, this
meant they had to use their surplus profits of trade with the West Indies
and with Europe in order to compete with other Western traders in China.
Large amount of money went to supplement the trade with China until
American merchants started to follow "chain routes" buying a variety of
goods enroute to China in order to increase the value of the cargo that
arrived in Canton.
As far as the use of opium, it had become quite a problem in China.
Often compared to the drug problem America is experiencing today, the
opium trade in China grew up in situations of demoralization often
destroying both the individual smoker and his family. Additionally, the
price of the drug often led to violence and corruption between the
smugglers and officials. All this in order to provide profits to the British
Empire and other Western powers.
Chinese officials were uncertain about what course of action to
take. Could they destroy the Chinese smugglers and embargo British
trade? (The British now had new steam gunboats that could be used to
influence the situation.) There was even talk of legalizing opium since
the illegal traffic could not be stopped. But in 1839, Daoguang Emperor
Imperial Commissioner, Lin Zexu, decided to compel the foreign traders to
stop bringing in the opium. The Chinese opium smugglers in Guangzhou
were suppressed. The Western traders barricaded themselves in their
factories. Finally, they had to surrender their stocks of opium. (It was
know by those foreign traders that more opium was already on its way and
that losses, at least for the British traders, would probably be covered by
the British government.)
It was Commissioner Lin's actions that precipitated the opium war.
The Westerners' war aims and strategy were worked out by Dr. William
Jardine and Lord Palmerston in London. The Jardine Trading Company
leased vessels to the British fleet and lent pilots, as well as translators,
to the British expeditionary force. New paddle-wheel steamers were sent
to Guangzhou and then up the coast in order to "secure privileges of
general commercial and diplomatic intercourse on a Western basis of
equality, and not especially to aid the expansion of the opium trade." 1
Battles were fought along the southeast coast of China. The British won
the Opium War of 1839-1842. The Qing agreement to the Treaty of
Nanking came in August of 1842. The Treaty of Nanking provided for:
extraterritoriality, an indemnity, a moderate tariff and direct foreign
contact with customs collectors, most favored-nation status, freedom to
trade with all. Additionally, it designated places for trade, or treaty
ports. For purposed of this thesis, the important stipulation of the
Nanking Treaty was the cession of the island of Hong Kong. After 1854,
Hong Kong became the center of all British trade with China.
The United States government debated its China policy or lack of one
when word of the Treaty of Nanking reached home. Commodore Lawrence
Kearney, United States Navy, Commander of the East India Squadron opened
representations to the imperial commission at Canton. He stopped short
of negotiating any agreement due to his lack of authorization. "Americans
had to reassert their basis of equality commercially with the British and
other countries in China. Accordingly, Congressman Caleb Cushing of
Massachusetts arrived in Macao on February 24, 1844, sent there by
President John Tyler as the first United States Commissioner. On July 3,
at Wangshia close by, assisted by American missionaries Dr. Peter Parker,
Elijah C. Bridgman, and Samuel Wells Williams, Cushing signed a treaty of
amity and commerce to open diplomatic relations with China." 2
The provisions of the Treaty of Wangshia were: (1) freedom to trade
with China and agreement to abide by China's trade regulations, (2) equal
treatment of Americans and other countries for commercial and political
privileges, and (3) promise by the United States that it sought no
territorial gains in China and would not use force to gain advantages from
China. Special provisions also permitted American to hire Chinese as
teachers and to purchase books recommended by the missionary advisors.
(Besides China signing a treaty with the United States, China also signed a
1 John King Fairbank, China A New History .
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1992), 200.
2Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific From
the Old China Trade to the Present . (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 7.
treaty with France in 1844.) Most important of all, it paved the way for
Americans to enjoy most favored nations treatment with the British and
everyone else in developing the China market.
This survey of the famous Anglo-Chinese conflict of the period
1839-42 suggests that the Chinese officials were far removed, in
their thinking, from the economic realities which they faced,
whereas the representatives of Britain's economic expansion,
particularly the pioneer opium merchants, know clearly what they
wanted and how to get it. It was soon to appear that the British
officials on their part, as has been true more recently in the course
of Sino-Western relations, were confident that they could win
military victories in China, but were less certain how to capitalize
upon them. Once the fighting stopped, they found themselves in a
diplomatic contest which was more evenly balanced. 1
With the Treaty of Nanking, the encroachment into China by foreign
powers began. The Qing government gave the island of Hong Kong to the
British (one quarter of the Nanking Treaty document was about Hong Kong:
articles XIII through XVI ana part of XVII) and opened the first five treaty
ports (Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai) with this document.
Palmerston had demanded the island as "a place of residence and of
commerce." ... In 1842, Pottinger had inherited Hong Kong as a base
of operations. British merchants had begun building there without
waiting for the confirmation of British sovereignty. But
Palmerston's successor as foreign secretary, Lord Aberdeen, did not
regard the island "in the light of a permanent conquest," foreseeing
that its possession would be "attended with great and certain
expense," and involve political complications with the Chinese. In
obtaining it at Nanking, Pottinger was therefore obliged to exceed
his instructions. His original demand there had been for the cession
of Hong Kong "as an atonement for the insult offered (at Canton) to
Her Majesty's Crown and Dignity." To save the emperor's face this
was changed in the treaty to the euphemistic explanation that
1 John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the
China Coast The opening of the Treaty ports, 1842-
1854
. (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1969), 83.
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British merchants needed some port "whereat they may careen and
refit their ships, when required and keep stores for that purpose... 1
Pottinger, as Hong Kong's first governor, was instructed to make it a
free port and to raise revenues by leasing the crown's land. Additionally,
a duty was to be levied on such items as wines, spirits, opium, and
tobacco in order to raise revenues. The colony was expected to be self-
supporting. The merchants welcomed Hong Kong as a protective
stronghold. Warehouses in the colony could store goods. During the war,
many had envisioned the colony as a commercial center for the future.
Issues such as the control ot Chinese residents in Hong Kong were worked
out just like issues of trade in discussions with the Chinese.
The British were able to change the position the Chinese held in
these discussions at Nanking; the Chinese negotiators had endorsed the
idea of the Chinese population of Hong Kong being governed by Chinese law
that would be administered by a subdistrict magistrate stationed at
Kowloon. The British negotiator agreed, in principle, but would later
argue that the British authorities in Hong Kong must have jurisdiction
over the Chinese residents of Hong Kong in order to keep the peace. The
Chinese eventually accepted the British approach (considered by many a
reciprocal extraterritoriality): the British government felt that this
arrangement would weaken the enforcement of the British law in Hong
Kong, so London countermanded the plan. The Chinese were notified that
London's position was that Hong Kong had been ceded, and therefore, its
residents were no longer under the jurisdiction of China. The Chinese, on
the other hand, felt that the treaty referred to the cession of the land for
use by the British; the Chinese did not believe Hong Kong's inhabitants
were to become subjects of the British. London's decision was final. In
April 1944, a Chinese magistrate was stationed at Kowloon to cooperate
with the Hong Kong magistrates in dealing with the Chinese coming from
the Chinese mainland. (It was not until the end of 1844 that a written
1 John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the
China Coast The opening of the Treaty ports, 1842-
1854
. (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1969), 123.
acknowledgment of British sovereignty over the island and people of Hong
Kong was obtained from the Chinese.)
It was widely known that the principles of the Treaty of Nanking
were never fuily accepted by the Chinese; and the British were not yet
satisfied. A second war, beginning in 1856, would occur between the
Chinese and the British and the French. A second treaty, in 1858, was
secured at Tianjin and opened more ports to the Western powers. In 1858,
China would sign treaties with Britain, the United States, France, and
Russia as equal sovereign powers; China would sign these treaties against
her will.
The original treaty signed by China with Great Britain had identified
five treaty ports to be used by Western traders; this would eventually
expand to more than eighty. These treaty ports were under the supervision
of Chinese compradors or foreign-hired business managers who would
manage the affairs beneath the overlordship of the taipans or firm
managers. The treaty ports were built on the out skirts of Chinese cities.
The British consulates were located there as were clubs, race courses,
and churches. The British consul and officials of other nations ruled these
treaty ports. There were gunboats in the vicinity to enforce rule and
protect foreign assets. And at Guangzhou, Xiamen and Fuzhou the island
location provided even more protection for the foreigners. In other treaty
ports, rivers, canals, creeks and waterways often created barriers to the
areas occupied by the foreigners.
These areas were rooted in Western culture but were also influenced
by the Chinese culture since assistance by Chinese was needed by the
foreigners in business and everyday life. Under extraterritoriality, the
Westerners were answerable only to foreign laws and not to those of the
Chinese; the foreign traders required their own law of contract to do
business.
The treaty tariff was an important aspect of the treaty port system.
The Chinese customs collectors lacked the authority and means to
influence the foreigners, so, foreign inspectors were appointed by the
Chinese to run the customhouse at Shanghai in 1854. This feature of the
treaty system allowed equality of competition and provided a badly needed
revenue for the Chinese government.
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As previously mentioned, the most favored nation clause was the
most important aspect of the treaties to the United States; it allowed all
foreign powers, including the United States, to share privileges given out
by the Chinese government. The Qing dynasty continued to loose ground as
the fortunes of the foreigners grew. The domestic opium trade, a foreign-
Sino venture, eventually replaced the importation of India opium. The
India to China opium trade had existed for more than a century, known as
the "treaty century"; the importance of opium to Britain's foreign trade
and expansion can not be understated.
After renewed hostilities in 1859, a third war was fought. In 1860,
an expedition of British and French troops occupied Beijing in order to
convince the Qing of Western determination. The Emperor's summer palace
was burned. The British annexed Kowloon peninsula and Stonecutters
Island with the Convention of Peking in 1860. American traders took
advantage of these newly won privileges as did other Western traders.
The United States by this time was a full partner in the system of unequal
treaties, which Chinese nationalist of future days would resent so
bitterly. Yet for years to come Americans "assumed self-righteously that
the Chinese favored them over Europeans because the United States
government had not won their privileges by using armed force." 1
The United States would be deeply involved in another aspect of the
intrusion into China by Western powers; the missionary movement was
beginning to grow and expand as more and more missionaries came to
China to spread Western ways and to convert the Chinese to Christianity.
This movement developed apart from the trade by American traders; it
was even at odds with the trade when it came to dealing in opium.
During the opium wars, the missionaries were often the news link to the
United States reporting home their observations, convictions, and their
frustrations at the unwillingness of the Chinese to adopt Western ways.
This connection with China would play an important role in the long term
relationship between the United States and China.
1 Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific From
the Old China Trade to the Present . (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 8.
1 1
In 1851, the Taiping Rebellion was the classic linkage of Christian
sectarianism with the peasant uprising within China. Hung Hsui-ch'uan
was the Taiping's prophet; he taught gospel of the Old Testament based on
Protestant Christianity (and a brotherhood of revolutionary nationalism
and egalitarianism). He became a militant evangelist and called for action
by the peasants of China; this resulted in a civil war against the Manchu
overlords. Foreign legions were sponsored by the rich merchants of
Shanghai; these troops were led by Frederick T. Ward from Salem,
Massachusetts. Ward earned the title "Ever-Victorious Army" from the
emperor after successfully suppressing the rebellion. After Ward died of
wounds received in battle, another American took over the foreign legions;
Henry A. Burgevine took command and took forty thousand silver dollars
for his personal use; he was. relieved by a British officer, Charles George
"Chinese" Gordon.
The Taipings were against gambling, opium, tobacco, idolatry,
adultery, prostitution, and footbinding. They advocated increased status
for women and used them in the army and to run the palaces. They
outlawed footbinding. The examination system, which had caused many
problems and helped bring on the rebellion, was changed not improved
under the Taiping. The idea of communal living and the grouping of
twenty-five families, with a common treasurer, never spread throughout
the countryside. The terrible result of the rebellion was the slaughter of
much of the populace and a tremendous amount of destruction throughout
China; a bad name was given to Christianity in the process.
For assistance in putting down the rebellion, the Manchu court gave
additional privileges to the British and the French and opened more ports
to Western traders. The American traders took advantage of gains made
again by the French and the British and, once again, piggybacked on the
exploitation of China.
American trade progressed in China. Furs and products from whaling
in the Pacific (to be used for domestic consumption) brought more and
more people into the business of trade. The route to China favored by
traders was from the Atlantic Ocean, southeast around Africa's Cape of
Good Hope, into the Indian Ocean, then to the West and then north to
Canton. The fur traders preferred the route around South America to
obtain their furs or along the northwest coast of North America, from
California to Oregon, and on to Nootka Sound of Vancouver Island or to
Russia's subarctic Alaskan and Aleutian islands. All voyages destined for
China were extremely long and very dangerous. All this changed with the
advent of steam; the long voyage around the cape was abandoned for the
direct route across the Pacific.
New commodities were continuously sought for trade with China.
Items such as: sandalwood, tortoise shell, pearls, and pearl shell came
from Polynesia and Melanesia, Australia, Fiji, and New Zealand. Birds'
nests came from Indonesia and the western Caroline Inlands. Trade
influenced expansionism as the British, French, and Germans took one
group of island after another. The United States concentrated on the
Hawaiian Islands. Much of the development and exploitation of the Pacific
can be attributed to China trade.
The Chinese struggled to make the old system of government work by
adopting Western ways. Their aim was peace through diplomacy and
accommodation, but self-strengthening was their long-term defensive
plan. Somehow, China planned to survive the internal turmoil and the
foreign invasion. So, in an effort to deal with the problems of the outside
world, the imperial court established the Office for General Management
which was to consolidate foreign affairs. There were five bureaus:
Russian, British, French, American and one for Coastal Defense.
Additionally, two agencies were attached to the Office for General
Management: the Inspectorate-general of Customs and the College of
Foreign Languages.
In the spring of 1861, the United States, under President Abraham
Lincoln faced civil war. The Secretary of State, William H. Seward, who
had visions of the United States playing a major role in the trade with
Asia, was forced to put aside those dreams and concentrate on gaining
international support for the Union in its war against the Confederate
South. Anson Burlingame was dispatched to China as minister
representing the United States; he had instructions to cooperate with the
European powers there. Seven years later, as Burlingame was retired from
his position as minister, Prince Kung of China appointed him to a mission
to discourage Europeans and Americans from pressing the modernization
of China. Burlingame said, When the oldest nation in the world,
containing one-third of the human race seeks, for the first time, to come
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into relations with the West, and requests the youngest nation, through its
representative, to act as the medium of such change, the mission is not
one to be solicited or rejected." 1 Burlingame was the first outspoken
American for receprocity rights for all Chinese.
Burlingame arrived in California with a Manchu and a Chinese, as co-
envoys, and proceeded on to New York City. When Burlingame met with
President Andrew Johnson, m 1868, a treaty was signed that committed
the United States to noninterference in Chinese affair. The treaty made
provisions for the entry of Chinese consuls and laborers into the United
States; it made provisions for reciprocal rights for Americans in China.
Peking, although not consulted, was pleased with the provisions of the
treaty and in the treaties signed with the British, French, Germans, and
Russians. Chinese student exchanges began in conjunction with the treaty;
this educational exchange began a new influence of the Chinese by the
United States.
China's self-strengthening movement was having major problems.
Mandarins were upset with the merchants and the industrialists; scholars
were directing undercover operations for the government. Christian and
Confucian ideology clashed. A campaign against American missionaries
broke out. Challenges to accepted customs were occurring everywhere.
Christian converts showed no tolerance for traditional beliefs. The
Chinese economy was suffering as Westerners were competing for
concessions and carving up the empire.
In order to protect their interests in Hong Kong, the British leased
the New Territories for a period of 99 years dating from 1 July 1898. The
new area formed a "rectangle extending from a line joining Deep Bay and
Mirs Bay in the north, to Lamma Island in the south, and added some 355
square miles to the colony.- This was a distinct gain for the British, but
it also benefitted the Americans who were glad to have access to the
godowns and warehouses on the mainland side of Hong Kong harbor.
"•Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific From
the Old China Trade to the Present . (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 117.
2 G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong . (London:
Oxford University Press, Amen House, 1964) p. 262,
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On September 6, 1899. after American businessmen appealed to the
United States government for assistance, Secretary of State John Hay, in a
series of Open Door notes, asked Japan, Russia, Germany, Great Britain,
France, and Italy to support a policy of equal trade for all nations within
their spheres of influence that had grown up in the neighborhood of the
treaty ports. Americans were not outraged by the impending break up of
China. All they wanted was equality of conceived opportunity.
B. THE BOXER REBELLION
In 1898, the anti-foreign anger in China was focused on the
Christian missionaries and their converts. Flooding from the Yellow River
and droughts in the northern part of China added to the frustration of the
Chinese. These conditions led to the so called Boxer Rebellion. The
Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists was a clandestine organization
from which the movement arose. Members practiced a kind of Chinese
boxing to prepare physically and spiritually for combat, Hence, the name
"boxer". The goals of the rebellion were both political and religious; anti-
foreign and anti-Christian feelings were conveyed during the movement.
The Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi supported the Boxers, and a majority of the
members of the Army became Boxers. As the movement grew and support
widened, foreign residents in Peking feared for their lives and a
multinational force of armed guards was organized from the ships
offshore. The Boxers met the force on the road to Peking.
In June through August of 1900, the Boxers ravaged the northern
countryside of China. Christian missionaries and their converts were
killed. A Japanese diplomat and the German Ambassador were also killed.
From the United States, orders from the President made twenty-five
hundred troops stationed in the Philippines available to combat the
situation. All told, over 15,500 soldiers, sailors, and marines of eight
different nations were brought together to end the bloodshed. Russia sent
about two hundred thousand more soldiers into Manchuria for suppression
of the Boxers. The actions by Russia upset the Japanese because of the
numbers of troops used and the delay in removing the troops from the area
afterwards. United States Secretary of State, John Hay, sent out a second
Open Door note of July 3, 1900, without notifying China or the other
nations involved in the situation. Hays wrote, "the policy of the
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Government of the United Slates is to seek a solution, which may bring
about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial
and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly
powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the
principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese
Empire." 1
Hays defined "the three pedestals of United States policy: (1) the
protection of American lives and property, (2) the opportunity for open and
impartial trading, and (3) the preservation of China." 2 It was his intention
to preserve China and to continue the open door trading policy. The Boxers
were defeated, first at Tientsin, and then in Peking. President McKinley
countermanded the orders he had originally given; the ten-thousand-man
American force would not be assigned to China and two-thirds of the
troops already in China would go to the Philippines. The United States
stood ready with troops to protect access to Peking. The number of
American troops assigned in China (with backups in the Philippines) grew;
also assigned duty in China: one battleship, two cruisers, and numerous
gunboats to patrol the coast and inland water ways. The interests of
civilization and trade were the justifications given for the show of force
by the United States. From this time on, Manila was far more important
than Hong Kong to market oriented Americans.
The Protocol of 1901. which assigned financial responsibilities of
the Boxer Rebellion to the Chinese government, put the damages at $333
million. Foreign troops were allowed to stay in Peking and to be stationed
at locations between the city and the coast. (The United States even
requested a parcel of land lor a naval coaling station until reminded that
this went against the Open Door policy.) The Open Door policy was given
more consideration by all parties after that. Fearing conflict, the foreign
powers did not partition China. It is important to remember that the Open
Door policy received much support from within the United States, but the
1 Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific From
the Old China Trade to the Present . (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 113.
2Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific From
the Old China Trade to the Present . (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 120.
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reality was that the policy was unenforceable. The Boxer Rebellion of
1900 was interpreted by the Chinese as just another example of the
exploitation of China by Western powers.
It was not long before there were more problems within China; the
country was being run by foreign ambassadors and Chinese territory was
being used by foreign powers for their imperial wars.
The situation with the foreign powers continued to cause internal
problems for China. In 1906. because of his dealings with Japan and the
termination of the Russo-Japanese War in the Treaty of Portsmouth,
President Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize; he wrote, "our
future history will be more determined by our position on the Pacific
facing China, than by our position on the Atlantic facing Europe."
The relationship between the United States and China continued to
sour; Americans were denounced for their role in the Boxer Rebellion. The
Immigration Act of 1904 was felt to be racist in that it barred more
Chinese from being admitted to the United States or its territories. In
response, American goods were boycotted in China and an American
railroad franchise was canceled. Some positive results were achieved in
the rocky relationship of the United States and China: in 1908, the United
States Congress allocated S12 million (approximately half of the
American share of the Boxer indemnity) towards a government program for
the training of Chinese in America. A preparatory school was set up at
Qinghua College in Beijing. (By 1929, twelve hundred and sixty-eight
students had been sent to the United States.) In 1924, the remaining half
of the indemnity, was allocated to the support of the China foundation;
this foundation gave grants for research and training.
In 1907, Japan and Russia had secretly divided Manchuria between
themselves. Japan recognized Russia's interest in Outer Mongolia and
Russia accepted Japan's control of Korea. Japan annexed Korea that same
year. The United States did not protest either of these two events.
President Roosevelt did not take any steps regarding Manchuria so as not
to cause the Japanese to feel that the United States was hostile to them.
The new American President, Taft, reversed the timid position taken
by Roosevelt. With a strong endorsement of the Open Door policy and
Chinese nationalism, and a new "dollar diplomacy" approach (substituting
dollars for bullets), the United States involved itself again in affairs of
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China. America became involved in the consortium of bankers that was to
financed railroad construction in China. The revolution in China, 1911,
was started, in part, because of this continued foreign interference.
Sun Yat-sen organized the Revive China Society to overthrow the
Manchus, to regain China for the Chinese, and to institute a republican
government. Sun traveled internationally in order to drum up support for
his cause; he was in the United States when the Qing dynasty collapsed
(the empress dowager died) in October of 1911. Sun was made President
of the Republic of China on January 1, 1912; Sun resigned in favor of Yuan
Shih-kai, the imperial army commander-in-chief, when Emperor P'u Yi, the
last Emperor, abdicated on February 12, 1912.
The American missionaries, who continued to have a great influence
in the United States on policy toward China, supported Yuan and the
Republic of China after Yuan promised to tolerate Christianity. Yuan even
approached the United States for financial assistance. Diplomatic
recognition of the new republic was withheld by Great Britain, France,
Germany and the United States in an attempt to gain further concessions
from China.
But in March 1913, when Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated, he
expressed opposition to the infringements being made on China; the United
States canceled it participation in the banking consortium. President
Wilson reversed policies approved by both Roosevelt and Taft and went
back to the "Open Door" policy. Wilson granted full diplomatic recognition
to China on May 21, 1913.
Within a month, civil war had broken out in China between the forces
of President Yuan and the Kuomintang. Regional leaders were to take
leadership roles in their regions; there was no conversion to nationalism.
Regional units broke away from the national army. Yuan made himself
emperor. Sun Yat-sen led the opposition. Yuan Shih-kai died in June of
1916, and with that, the age of the warlord was born in China.
Japan, supported a modern, nationalistic China, and supplied much
needed capital when the United States pulled out of the banking
consortium. In August of 1914, when war broke out in Europe, the focus
of Japan changed and war was declared on Germany. Japanese forces
overran German holdings in Tsingtao, Kiaochow Bay, and on the south coast
of Shantung Peninsula. The Japanese occupied German colonies in the
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Marshall Islands, the Carolines, the Marianas, and in Palau. Twenty-one
Demands were presented to ^ne President of China by the Japanese. The
demands were divided into live categories: "(1) recognize Japan's special
interest in Shantung; (2) yield to Japan's demands for Inner Mongolia and
Manchuria; (3) accept joint Sino-Japanese operation of China's iron and
steel industries; (4) promise not to cede any coastal area to another
foreign power; and (5) allow Japan to control the vital elements of China's
internal administration including police, military, and economic affairs." 1
The Chinese made the demands public in order to embarrass the Japanese;
the fifth category was withdrawn by the Japanese. The Chinese were
forced to concede points on the other four demands. The Chinese people
were insulted by the demands; Japanese goods were boycotted. No outside
powers came to the defense of the Chinese.
It is to be noted throughout this story, the United States had no
particular interest in Hong Kong or the British trade. The American
concern was for the entire China market. The center of American interest
was Beijing, or better, Beijing and Shanghai. Furthermore, foreign trade
of any kind was not all that important to a youthful and growing American
of the early twentieth century. It was only after America became a global
power, possibly beginning with World War I, that an entirely new global
outlook entered the American psyche.
In April 1917 the United States entered the war against Germany.
China also declared war against war against Germany. The Secretary of
State, now Robert Lansing, conceded Japan's special interest in China, and
in return, Japan pledged support for the United States' Open Door policy
and China's territorial integrity. President Wilson then revived the
international banking consortium plans for development of China. For
Japan's support of the plan, the agreement was made to stay out of
Manchuria.
By 1916, China had split into regions dominated by warlords. The
warlords were sucking the life out of China with high taxes, intimidation,
inflation of the currency and neglect of the infrastructure, along with, the
"•Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific From
the Old China Trade to the Present . (New York:
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revival of the use of opium. Patriotic feelings arose in China as a result
of the Japanese injustices. The Chinese felt betrayed by the United
States, and on May 4, 1919, students displayed their displeasure. Mao
Zedong verbally attacked the; United States and President Wilson for
failure to support China's territorial integrity. A movement had started
with the May Fourth uprising: the New Culture Movement.
The Americans were placed in a difficult position; they wanted to
share with the British all the commercial privileges the British extracted
from China. American officials generally sided with the Westerners
desire for law and order. To a certain extent, Hong Kong was a model
colony. On the other hand, American liberals, particularly the
missionaries, sympathized with the Chinese struggle against the unequal
treaties. Those Americans had no sympathy for Hong Kong which they
regarded as the symbol of crass materialism in Eastern Asia.
President Harding set up a conference in Washington to discuss the
problems of internationalism and arms reduction. The Washington
Conference (1921-1922) was very successful and produced a number of
treaties. The Five-Power Treaty established naval limitations in order to
avoid a race for a naval buildup in the Pacific. The Four-Power Treaty was
an agreement with Japan to respect possessions in the Pacific and bring
to an end the old Anglo-Japanese alliance. The Nine-Power Treaty sought
to guarantee the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of
China. As a result of the conference, Japan withdrew from areas in Asia
with the exception of Korea and Manchuria.
Problems continued within China. In order to protect American
interests within China, the United States stationed soldiers and marines
in country; American gunboats patrolled the rivers. Americans felt no
obligation to protect Hong Kong. When Chinese attempted to take control
of foreign run custom houses, American warships intervened. Needless to
say, the Chinese were disappointed with the American response. Many
Chinese began to look toward the Soviet Union for support. When Sun Yat-
sen died in 1925, violence occurred, much directed toward Americans, to
include the Christian missionaries.
The May 30 Movement (1926) forced the United States to take a new
look at China relations. British interests and American interests were
drifting farther apart. After the death of Sun Yat-sen, a power struggle
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within China began. Chiang Kai-shek took control of the nationalists'
forces and won control of the Kuomintang party and government; Mao
Zedong was the leader of the Communist forces. The struggle began.
American forces stationed themselves between Shanghai and Nanking in
order to defend American interest. American support was behind Chiang
Kai-shek. British and American interests moved closer together.
Americans sided with the British and Chiang Kai-shek in opposition of the
Russians and the Communist. All this changed in 1931 when the Japanese
moved into Manchuria. A series of events took place which linked Japan
and Germany as fascist aggressors against the British and Americans;
ultimately, Russia would join the same side. Eventually Hong Kong,
Shanghai and many Chinese cities would become friendly bastions of the
free world. They were smashed in World War II only to be reestablished
after long years of recovery after World War II, and the coming and
passing of the Cold War.
The main problem in the country continued to be with the poor who
were virtually being ignored by the government. The peasants were not
being ignored by the Communist party, however; they were schooled in
guerrilla warfare and recruited for the Communist struggle.
Manchuria became the focus of interest within China when the
Japanese captured Mukden. The United States responded with the "Stimson
Doctrine"; the United States was not recognizing any changes in the treaty
rights of Japan in China, nor violations of the Open Door policy. The
Japanese then entered Shanghai and withdrew from the League of Nations.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1933, began a program of naval
construction in hopes of pressuring Japan; Japan responded with a naval
buildup of its own. In July 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out.
Peking was not damaged, but Shanghai was bombed by the Japanese. Next
came the "rape of Nanking", the fall of Canton, and the fall of Wuhan. By
1938, all major Chinese cities were controlled by the Japanese.
The Communists declared war on the Japanese when Manchuria was
seized. In 1937, a united effort of the Communists and Nationalists was
unable to beat the Japanese but convinced Americans that the internal
situation in China had improved.
The Japanese attacked American assets in the drive to control China.
An attack on the American vessel, the Panay, enraged Roosevelt; a full
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apology and indemnity were demanded and received. Americans provided
some financial assistance and technical assistance to the Chinese in their
efforts to fight Japan. Japan's naval forces continued to grow and a "New
Order" was proclaimed by Japan for the Orient. (The attack on Pearl
Harbor was just two years away.)
The Japanese felt that their aggression in China would not bring the
Americans into a conflict. Their moves toward Southeast Asia, for raw
materials, commercial strongholds, and defensive post, were another
story. With the world watching the war in Europe, Japan eyed French
Indochina. The French government was dominated by the Germans at this
point and was unable to deal with the Japanese; the Japanese were granted
permission to use airfields in French Indochina. The United States was
the only country in a position to stop the Japanese in the Pacific and took
steps to stop the Japanese. First, there was an embargo against Japan on
aviation fuel and high quality scrap iron. After the Tripartite Pact (Japan,
Italy, Germany pledging total assistance to each other) was signed, the
embargo was expanded to include all scrap iron.
In a show of support for both Great Britain and Japan, the United
States announced its intention to terminate the Commercial Treaty of
1911 with Japan. When Japan moved into southern Indochina, President
Roosevelt imposed an economic blockade by freezing all Japanese assets
in the United States. At that point, all petroleum exports to Japan were
stopped. Diplomacy provided no hope in resolving the problems between
the two countries. The Japanese did propose a conference between the
United States and Japan be held.
Japan proposed abolishing the Tripartite Pact and promised
neutrality for Southeast Asia so long as Japan could obtain resources
there. Japan also demanded normalization of trade, including petroleum,
and the end of aid to China from the United States. Japan refused to pull
out of Indochina until peace was reached in China (on Japan's terms), and
Japan required recognition by the United States on Japanese sovereignty in
Manchukuo (Manchuria) and as well as rule of China.
Diplomatic efforts continued, but the embargo on petroleum set the
Japanese on a course of wai with the United States. On November 26,
1941, the United States rejected the Japanese plan. On December 7, 1941,
the Japanese forces attackeo Pearl Harbor. In all this, Hong Kong was not
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a major player. It was recognized that Hong Kong was the center of
British interests in the area, but it was also taken for granted that the
United States would act as a protector for Hong Kong while the British
homeland was suffering at the hands of the Nazis.
C. WORLD WAR II
The British forces in Hong Kong were not strong enough to defend the
entire colony against a Japanese invasion. The British plan: to deny use of
the harbor to the enemy. Major-General Maltby, the British Commander,
felt, with reinforcements, he could defend part of the mainland as well as
the island. Troops were in place by December 7, 1941, and Hong Kong was
attacked on the morning of the 8th of December. The Japanese crossed the
river at Lowu and dive-bombed Kai Tak aerodome.
Since the British troops were without an air force and lacked an air
defense capability, the Japanese moved rapidly in their attack. The
British withdrew to their defense line. When the most important defense
post was captured, the order was given to withdraw to the island. The
British troops crossed at Lyemun from a bridgehead at Devil's Peak. On
the 18th of December, the Japanese landed on the island between Lyemun
and North Point; the Japanese plan: to cut the colonies defense into two by
an advance to Repulse Bay on the south and by way of Wong Nei Chong Gap.
On Christmas Day, the British resistance ended and the Japanese held Hong
Kong. The Americans were in no position to give effective support to the
British; they had their own problems in Manila.
The Europeans were interned at Stanley for the period of the
occupation: three years and eight months. The Chinese population was
reduced by one-third. General deterioration of public services within Hong
Kong such as roads, health services, and malaria control all occurred
during the Japanese occupation.
The subject of British control of Hong Kong after the war was being
challenged even prior to the end of the war. The United States Secretary
of the Treasury, Morgenthau, in November 1941, proposed the United
States try to encourage the British to sell Hong Kong to the Chinese. "In
the discussions over the Atlantic Charter in March 1943, Roosevelt felt
that clause 3 in the charter, urging the liberation of all peoples, applied
as much to those of the British colonies as to those peoples overrun by the
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Germans and Japanese, and the President ". . . once or twice urged the
British to give up Hong Kong as a gesture of good will... 1 " The Dutch were
similarly pressed to grant independence to the Dutch East Indies." 2
Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed the future of Hong Kong at the
Yalta Conference in February of 1945.
The American President was so anxious to secure Russian help in the
Pacific War that he was willing to grant concessions to Russia at
the expense of both Japan and China; and at the same time, as part of
the general Far Eastern settlement, he urged in private
conversations with Stalin that Hong Kong should be given back to the
Chinese or internationalized as a free port. Churchill was excluded
from that part of the negotiations relating to the Far East - as was
the Chinese representative - and we are told he 'exploded' at a
resolution on the subject of trusteeship which he thought questioned
the British control over her colonies. 3
As planning for the end of the war continued and the discussions
focused on the administration of the territories recovered from enemy
occupation, the policy to be followed by the Allied Combined Civil Affairs
Committee was to be laid down by the government which had authority
over the area before the enemy occupation. In the case of Hong Kong, the
British were to set up a temporary military administration of Hong Kong
upon recovery of the territory. A planning committee that had been set up
1 G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong . (London:
Oxford University Press, Amen House, 1964) p. 301
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by the Colonial Office and War Office to study the resumption of British
authority in Hong Kong was to serve as the British Civil Affairs Unit.
As the United States continued to fight World War II, the focus on
the struggle within China was lost to events throughout Southeast Asia
and the rest of the world. But the struggle still continued with American
assistance. United States Army General Joseph Stillwell organized the
Air Transport Command to aeliver supplies to China from Assam in India;
Chinese troops were flown out of China to train. In October of 1943, a
multinational force, to include some Chinese military, went into Burma to
break the Japanese blockade of China.
General Stilwell opened the Ledo Road in the Yunnan Province of
China; this offensive in China was followed by a Japanese
counteroffensive: the Japanese seized some of the airfields used by
Stilwell and threatened Chiang Kai-shek's capital in Chungking. With this
setback, Stilwell criticized Chiang Kai-shek for his reluctance to deploy
his forces against the Japanese; Stilwell was recalled by Roosevelt. The
relationship between the United States and China suffered from this
event. "Stilwell's successors., due to his dogged achievements, would
eventually win the struggle he began almost alone to comply with General
Marshall's 1942 order to "support China." 1 But Stilwell, along with many
other Americans was not particularly interested in the fate of Hong Kong.
As the tides of war turned in favor of the United States, President
Truman published the Potsdam Declaration (with Chiang Kai-shek's
approval), a demand for unconditional surrender of Japan. The Japanese
made no response to the Declaration, and on August 6, 1945, an atomic
bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. With still no response to the Potsdam
Declaration from Japan, a second atomic bomb was dropped, this time on
Nagasaki, on August 9, 1945. Whatever the effects of the atomic bombs,
the fact is that on August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito went on the radio to
call for an end to the Second World War in the Pacific.
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D. POST WORLD WAR II
After the Japanese were defeated (14 August 1945), the surrender
at Hong Kong had to be delayed until the arrival of the British Pacific
Fleet, under Rear-Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, on the 30th of August.
With the end of World War II, the first problem to be solved within Hong
Kong was that of public services. Troops were used to restore law and
order; food supplies were organized. The movement of Chinese troops to
Kowloon, for transportation to Manchuria, caused the populace to be
uneasy. On 1 May, 1946, Sir Mark Young assumed his position as governor,
ended the military rule, and began the process of adapting the colony to a
post-war world. No Americans were involved in the operation.
China still struggled with the civil war between Communist forces
and Nationalist forces. (On November 1, 1942, the United States ended
extraterritoriality with China Great Britain ended their rights as well.)
The Cairo Conference, in November 1943, had allowed Chiang Kai-shek to
meet with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill as a
partner in the war with Japan. America still had high hopes for China
becoming a great power and ally in balancing the power in East Asia
between Russia and Japan. The United States promoted China into one of
the five permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations.
The United States once again assisted the Nationalists in their
struggle against the Communist forces of Mao Zedong; this included
sending soldiers and marines of the United States to fight along side the
Nationalists. It was at this point in time that many experts now say the
United States should have left China. The Soviets and the Nationalist
Republic of China signed a treaty of friendship in August of 1945, showing
that the relationship between Russia and Mao was not a friendly one. The
Russians had taken hundreds of millions of dollars worth of equipment
from Manchuria and sent it home. And when the Soviet armies left
Manchuria, large quantities of rifles and machine guns were turned over to
the armies of Mao. The Communists wasted no time in taking control of
the cities of Manchuria.
Mao and Chiang came together, at the request of the United States,
to negotiate; it was the intention of the United States to bring the two
forces together to fight the Soviet Red Army. Resolutions between Chiang
and Mao were proposed; the goal was to bring about "(1) a new constitution
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based on Sun Yat-sen's three-stage principles to introduce democratic
government, (2) phase reductions of their armed services; and (3) truce
teams comprised of equivalent KMT, CCP, and U.S. representations to root
out truce violations as they might arise." 1
The negotiating process stalled and claims of "support for the
Communists" by State Department personnel were made by the then
Chinese Ambassador, Patrick J. Hurley, who was negotiating the plan; he
resigned his post in frustration. President Truman sent retired General
George C. Marshall to China to continue the negotiations. His mission was
doomed to fail as Chiang advanced his troops against the Communists.
Warfare broke out; inflation and starvation throughout China would lead to
the eventual defeat of the Nationalists.
The United States, under President Truman, would continue to
attempt to resolve the problems of China in favor of the Nationalist;
equipment, arms and ammunition were provided by the United States. The
China Aid Act of April 1948 provided S400 million for the struggle, but
this was not enough to sustain Chiang. The fighting would continue until
Chiang Kai-shek resigned the presidency and withdrew to Taiwan. The
Peoples's Republic of China was born after thirty-seven years of civil war
in China. It is estimated that the United States, since V-J day, had spent
more than three billion dollars in support of the Nationalist forces. The
United States began a policy of nonrecognizition of China that would last
until 1979.
Again, it is to be noted that Britain and the United States went their
separate ways. Britain recognized the government of the People's
Republic of China in February of 1950, and, in an attempt to avoid
conflicts between the British and Chinese troops, kept British troops
away from the borders of Hong Kong. The British were concerned with
Hong Kong and trade. The Americans were concerned by this time almost
exclusively with the role of China in the Cold War. The United States did
not care about Hong Kong, until it became the free world's best
observation point for developments on mainland China.
1 Arthur Power Dudden, The American Pacific From
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In June of 1950, when North Korean Communists attacked the
Republic of Korea, the United Nations intervened. There was much
military activity in the colony; troops, some from Hong Kong, were moved
into Korea; Chinese troops joined the North Korean fight. The United
States made commitments to the Nationalist forces in Taiwan and placed
an embargo on trade with China; a United Nations embargo followed. This
embargo would greatly impact Hong Kong trade. With the Korean War, Hong
Kong becomes increasingly important to the United States. It is a brand
new factor in the cold war strategy.
The French in 1954, agreed to divide Indo-China into Laos, Cambodia
and Vietnam. This impacted Hong Kong in that refugees were entering the
colony to escape the Communists. "The population increased from an
estimated 1,600,000, including 15,000 non-Chinese, at the end of 1945, to
'something over 2,500,000" m 1956.
"
1 The population strained the
resources of the colony. The registration of the people of Hong Kong began
in 1949 and the restriction to emigration began in 1953. The problems of
over population and refugees, dominated the post-war years for Hong Kong.
Social welfare programs and the education system also became the focus
of the government of Hong Kong. Public works projects were begun.
Housing, a reservoir to supply the colony's water, a new runway for the
airport, ferry terminals, a City Hall, a breakwater and reclamation for
general industry were all undertaken.
Hong Kong trade began to diversify so as to become less dependant
on China. Many Chinese moved from Shanghai to Hong Kong and invested
their capital in the colony. The textile industry and other light industries
grew within the colony. Raw materials were imported to support this.
Commercial shipping and port facilities expanded to handle the changes
within the colony. British markets were opened to Hong Kong goods
through imperial preference and the dependence on China ended.
In the 1950s and 1960s, Mao tried to reform China. The speech, "Let
a Hundred Flowers Blossom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend,"
1 G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong . (London:
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Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong . Leyden,
1955, p.27.
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gave rise to free expression within China which result in criticism of the
CCP; it was discontinued. The Great Leap Forward was developed; China
experienced three years of economic crisis as a result (1960-1962). The
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was proclaimed, by Mao, in 1966.
The dramatic upheaval that followed shook the country to its
foundations. The Red Guards, consisting mostly of middle-school
and university students, took to the streets and, brandishing the
Little Red Book of Mao's sayings, attacked teachers, bureaucrats,
intellectuals, scientists technicians and many others accused of
being "capitalist roaders." The newly established Cultural
Revolution Group in the CCP Central Committee-whose most
prominent member was Mao's wife, Jiang Qing-was the chief leader
and instigator of the movement. The Communist party almost
disintegrated as a national organization, with countless party
members forced to undergo humiliating public self-criticism (Deng
Xiaoping among them) and sent to prisons, or simply executed on the
spot. . . The final resolution of the conflict came only after the
deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao in 1976. 1
The Cultural Revolution altered China's relationship with the United
States and with the Soviet Union. (China's relationship with the Soviet
Union, in 1960, was characterized by exchanges of denunciations between
the two parlies.) In 1965, China and the United States purposefully took
measures to avoid confrontation on the issue of Vietnam. The United
States promised American planes would try to avoid Chinese air space.
Mao focused on domestic issues rather than the Americans who were
fighting close to Chinese borders.
In 1972, President Richard Nixon visited China, and with that visit,
"ended twenty years of confrontation and isolation between the United
States and China." 2 In 1976. Hua Guofing was designated to succeed Mao,
but it became apparent that Deng Xiaoping was the individual that had the
1 Robert H. Taylor, ed., Asia and the Pacific,
Handbooks to the Modern Wo rld (New York: Facts On
File Publications, 1991) vol.1, p. 73.
2 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; The United
States and China Since 1972 . (Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institute, 1992), 23.
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power. In 1977, China embarked on a road to economic modernization, a
road it has been following ever since. And this would indicate a new
chapter in the story of Hong Kong, Sino-British relations and the interests
of the United States.
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III. INTERESTS OF 7 HE U.S. AND U.S. CITIZENS IN HONG KONG
According to the State Department, American interests in Hong Kong
include: (1) a smooth transition from British sovereignty to Chinese
sovereignty, (2) continued protection of human rights in Hong Kong, (3)
democratic development, and (4) strengthening the relationship between
the United States and Hong Kong. But it is economic and commercial
interest that drive every aspect of America's foreign policy toward Hong
Kong today. It is with this interest that the discussion must begin.
A. ECONOMIC AND COMME RCIAL INTERESTS
With the growing importance of the Chinese economy in the world
and the implications of a "Greater China" (to include Hong Kong and
possibly Taiwan), economic and commercial interest in Hong Kong been
the most important interest the United States has in the colony. An
indication of just how important: in 1992, the two-way trade between the
United States and Hong Kong was estimated to have exceeded $18 billion.
Hong Kong is a major financial center for Asia. It is a free port
imposing no tariffs on imports, except for duty on alcohol and some luxury
goods. Hong Kong is seen as the capitalist gateway into China, with a
potential market of over a billion people. Currently, the United States
sells computers, telecommunications equipment, agricultural goods and
food stuffs to Hong Kong. "It is the largest market in the world for
American agricultural products on a per capita basis, and a major seller of
textiles, toys, and consumer electronics." 1 Hong Kong ranks number 13
among trading partners of the United States.
The State Department reports that direct investment by the United
States in Hong Kong is in excess of $7 billion, and that investment is
primarily in finance and trade. Over 250 American firms are regionally
headquartered in Hong Kong. But the emphasis on Hong Kong is due almost
entirely on the linkage between Hong Kong and the mainland. If that
1 A Report To Congress On Conditions In Hong Kong
As Of March 31, 1993, by the State Department, as
required by Sec. 301 of the United States - Hong
Kong Policy Act of 1992.
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linkage is broken, the United States still has an option of constructing
new links in the form of direct trade and investments with the mainland.
Under the Joint Declaration, China should protect the economic and
commercial interests of Hong Kong, by allowing the economic and
commercial activities to remain autonomous after 1997 under the promise
of "one country, two systems". There is a great fear, among many, that
this promise will not be kepi, and many Hong Kong firms have shifted their
legal headquarters offshore, tor that reason. One example of a company
that has done this is Jardine Matheson, a very old and famous Hong Kong
company.
The United States, in an attempt to protect interests in Hong Kong,
has enacted the United States - Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (see
section E). But United States' legislation cannot solve some of the
problems that are already occurring in Hong Kong in the area of economics,
for example, the construction of the new airport on a neighboring island.
The $22 billion airport project for Hong Kong is being threatened,
because China has refused to back the international contracts and loans
that must be in place since the project will continue beyond 1997. (This
is required under the Basic t.aw). It is said the Chinese are acting as if
the airport project is an attempt by the British to loot the Hong Kong
treasury before they leave. Many companies from the United States
(Morgan Stanley, Bechtel and Morrison Knudsen) are involved in the
project. Many British companies have won contracts as well; a British
consortium got the contract to build a suspension bridge leading to the
airport (the airport will be located on another island). Work is moving
ahead on the airport project, even without the approval of the Chinese
government. The site is being prepared for $1.16 billion by a team that
includes the American company of Morrison Knudsen and the Chinese
company China Harbour Engineers. It is feared that the Chinese are
increasingly skeptical about an airport initiative. When eventually a more
efficient airport might be built on the mainland itself.
An interesting aspect of the airport saga is that the Chinese
promised to sign an agreement approving the project if British Prime
Minister John Major would visit Beijing; Major made the trip in 1991 and
signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese, yet, the Chinese
have not followed through with the agreement.
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As world leaders watch the events in Hong Kong, many question the
motives of the Chinese government. "The Chinese are undermining their
credibility" for living up to agreements according to Winston Lord, former
United States Ambassador to China and current Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asia and the Pacific. There is already an uneasiness in
Hong Kong, and this is not helping the situation.
Another important fact to note is that the Chinese have made allies
in an unusual place: the businessmen of Hong Kong. Knowing well that the
Chinese will control Hong Kong one day, the business elite, through the
Business and Professionals federation, seek new ways to get along with
China. They have suggested that Governor Patten withdraw his pro-
democracy proposals. Accoiding to the chairman of the group, Vincent Lo,
"China will not sit back and do nothing. It is not acceptable, in our view,
that Hong Kong has to be the victim of a major confrontation with China." 1
This attempt to get along with China does not surprise many given the
future relationship between Hong Kong and Beijing authorities.
The is little doubt that American economics can play a positive role
in Hong Kong's future growth and stability. But economic interests of the
United States, as they pertain to the opening markets of China, are not
tied to Hong Kong alone. China is opening up to foreign investments and
the British colony of Hong Kong is no longer the only way into the country.
Most Favored Nation (MFN) for China must be renewed in July 1993.
Although MFN for China is a separate issue from MFN for Hong Kong, there
is little question that Hong Kong would suffer significantly if the renewal
does not go through. And China has said they will not tolerate MFN being
tied to any other issues (human rights, etc.). The United States can
influence events in Hong Kong but should not use MFN for China to do this;
it would not only harm the economy of China but would harm the economy
of Hong Kong as well. When Governor Patten met with President Clinton on
May 03, 1993, Patten urged the renewal of MFN for China without
conditions. Some day the Americans might well strive for MFN treatment
for themselves in the Chinese market.
1 Louis Kraar, "Storm Over Hong Kong," Fortune . 08
March, 1993, 99.
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B. ASSURING A SMOOTH TRANSITION FROM BRITISH TO CHINESE
SOVEREIGNTY
Certainly, it is in the Dest interest of the United States that there
be a smooth transition for hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty
if, for no other reason, than economics: the colony is, after all, our 13th
largest trading partner but our trade would suffer if the existing peaceful
Hong Kong-China connection were to be disturbed.
In order for this smooth transition to transpire in 1997, certain
events, according to William H. Overholt, must occur. "The central issues
of Hong Kong's future concern the ability of both sides to implement a
policy of 'one country, two systems': (1) neither side must subvert the
other's political system; (2) "hina must actively support Hong Kong's
autonomous capitalist economic system; and (3) Hong Kong must govern
itself with economic efficiency." 1 These objectives must be achieved in
an atmosphere of peace and harmony.
How can the United States help 9 In a world with a global economy,
the United States must continue its policy of MFN and must not appear to
meddle in the internal affairs of China. Tension between the two
countries on the issue of Hong Kong already exists because the United
States has enacted The United States - Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992.
This attempt to put pressure on the Chinese and protect United States'
interest in the colony after 1997 is righteously condemned in China as a
blatant effort to limit China's right to absolutely sovereignty. The
Chinese argue that their policy to Hong Kong is frankly no business of the
United States.
C. PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The protection of human rights has long been dear to the citizens of
the United States. Never has that been more apparent than it was in June
1989 when the world watched as a student demonstration in Tiananmen
Square was violently suppressed by the Chinese military. The United
States was outraged as the demonstration was crushed. Hundreds of pro-
1 William H. Overholt, "Hong Kong and China after
1997: The Real Issues," The China Challenge . 1991
30-52.
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democracy demonstrators were killed; widespread arrests and executions
followed the event. China denied reports of any wrong doing. American
lawmakers quickly enacted sanctions against China. Americans expressed
their outrage in unprecedented numbers.
That spring and summer, over one million Hong Kong people marched
in support of democracy, freedom, and human rights for China. Fear had
motivated the Hong Kong people, many for the first time, into political
action; a call for the protection of human rights and democracy for Hong
Kong, after 1997, was heard from within the colony. Americans simply
assumed that they and the people of Hong Kong were on the same wave
length and would stay that way.
As the 1997 deadline approaches, uncertainty about a future under
China has caused a wave of anxiety throughout Hong Kong. There has been
an increase in immigration of the colonies' elite to countries like the
United States, Canada, and Australia. Businesses have relocated their
corporate headquarters in cder to better protect their assets. Countries,
like the United States, with substantial interests in the colony, have
continuously voiced their opinions on the subject of protection of human
rights in one international forum after another.
China, as a kind of spokesman of the third world, has been speaking
on the subject, too, to make its position known. The following
statements, recently made by key Chinese officials, illustrate the
Chinese resentment against interference in Chinese practices and policies
of human rights:
It is obviously one-sided and harmful to make irresponsible
comments about the human rights situation in developing countries
in disregard of the difference in historical background and cultural
tradition as well as the actual conditions in these countries. 1
1 FBIS-Ch Sept. 24, 1992. p. 3. Originally a Xinhua
report in English of Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's
address to the 47th session of the General
Assembly.
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For the people of developing countries, the right to subsistence and
the right to development are undoubtedly the fundamental and the
most important human rights of all. 1
At the Third Prepratory Meeting of the International Conference on Human
Rights that was held in September, 1992 in Geneva, China said:
Asian countries proposed that the agenda should include such items
as abiding by the principles of the UN Charter, and making all out
efforts to rapidly wipe out racial discrimination, apartheid, foreign
occupation and domination, any form of xenophobia, and other
serious violations of human rights. 2
... on how to appraise' the degree of democracy and the general
situation of human rights. Asian nations emphasized the
indivisibility of citizens' economic, social, cultural and political
rights. Nevertheless, some Western nations were opposed to such a
view. . .
Asian nations maintained that each nations cultural, social and
religious characteristics and traditions should be taken into full
account when implementing principles on human rights. They also
called for respect for a country's sovereignty and territorial
integrity and non-interference in other countries' internal affairs,
as well as avoiding double standards. Some Western nations again
raised objections. 3
Some Chinese added the following observations:
. . . unfair and unjust international political and economic order is
jeopardizing the economic and social development of the developing
countries, faced with hunger, disease, poverty, unemployment and
illiteracy. 4
1 FBIS-Ch Sept. 24, 1992. p. 3. Originally a Xinhua
report in English of Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's
address to the 47th session of the General
Assembly.
2 FBIS September 25, 1992 p. 4. Beijing Central
People's Radio September 23, 1992.
3FBIS September 25, 1992 p. 4. Beijing Central
People's Radio September 23, 1992.
4 FBIS September 15, 1992. o. 1. Xinhau in English
September 14, 1992.
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Splitting the human rights concept, with undue emphasis on civil and
political rights while neglecting economic, social and cultural
rights, is another obstacle to the enjoyment of human rights . . . 1
While events in the international community are constantly changing
and unrest is brewing throughout the world, some western
politicians consider this a good opportunity to unify the world
according to Western values. In fact, this world remains a
diversified world with myriads of variations. All countries have
their own historical traditions, cultural backgrounds, religious
beliefs, ideologies and values. They are at different stages of
development and have different social systems, economic patterns
and development strategies. It is obviously unrealistic and
impossible to impose a pattern on different countries. This world
remains a multipolar world in which the economic development of
North and South is unbalanced and beset by friction, competition and
conflicts of interest. It is also apparently unrealistic and
impossible for one or several large powers to dominate the world.
Only when generally acknowledged principles are upheld can a new
international order acceptable to all countries be established. These
are the five principles of mutual nonaggression, noninterference in
one another's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence.
^
It is obvious that the Chinese views on the subject of human rights
differ drastically from those of the West. The vigorous championship of
the Chinese views of human rights proves that the Chinese are learning
how to 'play the game' of international politics and is seen as a positive
sign for the country and its global relationships. The Chinese are
determined to separate economic and trade issues from the human rights
issues. The United States has threatened to tie the subject of human
rights to renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status of China. This
effort to link MFN to human rights is completely unacceptable to the
1 FBIS September 15, 1992. p. 1. Xinhau in English
September 14, 1992.
2 FBIS-Ch January 15, 1992. p. 2. Was originally an
article by PRC Foreign Minister Quan Qiche, titled:
"Unrest is Still Brewing Throughout the World" and
was in Hong Kong's Tzu Ching on January 5, 1992.
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Chinese. Keeping Chinese products out of the American market hurts
exporters and manufacturers and all those that are benefiting from the
free market reforms of China's economy. The linkage of human rights and
trade is detrimental to all concerned and most of all it threatens serious
damage to the Americans in Hong Kong.
D. DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
The United States fought for. and won its independence from the
Great Britain in 1776. From the beginning, this country has identified
with independence and democracy, and has supported countries with
democratic forms of government and those fighting for democratic reform.
To "strengthen and enlarge ihe common wealth of free nations that share a
commitment to democracy and individual rights" 1 is listed as one of the
national interests and objectives in the 1990s. America's support for
democracies and democratic forms of governments has worked its way
into its foreign policy for Asia and the rest of the world. At the recent
Senate confirmation hearing for Assistant Secretary For East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord said, of democracy :
Equally compelling is the need to perfect the American experiment
in democracy. We must practice at home what we preach overseas.
We can project to troubled countries a multi-ethnic society that
reconciles the need for national purpose with the right of groups to
be distinctive. As President Eisenhower once said, "Whatever
America hopes to bring to pass in the world must first come to pass
in the heart of America." There can be no greater contribution to our
Asian policy than fostering domestic economic vigor and social
cohesion in America. Our Asian friends recognize this. Progress at
home will burnish our leadership credentials. It will make us
competitive in the marketplace of goods and credible in the
marketplace of values. It will help secure the resources needed for
international action. And it will steady popular support without
which our foreign policy founders. 2
1 National Military Strategy of the United States,
January 1992, 5.
2Winston Lord, in statement before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC,
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The United States specifically lists "fostering the growth of
democracy" as one of the security interests in Asia 1 What does China
think about democracy? Some say China fears democracy. What is
probably a little more accurate is that China does not worry about, fear or
even think about any Western label for its government.
The British in Hong Kong have never been too concerned about
democracy in their administration of the Crown Colony. After the
Tiananmen Square massacre, a movement swelled within the colony
calling for more democracy. After all, the people of Hong Kong enjoyed
individual freedoms and rights under the British rule of law; the citizens
were granted a certain amount of freedom of religion, movement, peaceful
assembly and association as well as free speech and press. The
organizations supporting democratic reform in Hong Kong failed to unite,
and therefore, were without the financial backing and clout need to
energize the movement. After that time, the momentum dwindled but the
call for democracy was given a new lift by Governor Patten.
What does all this mean for Hong Kong? China did not promise
Western style democracy to Hong Kong; what was promised was a "high
degree of autonomy". Even the business elite of Hong Kong have not
endorsed democratic reform lor Hong Kong. It has been said that Hong
Kong is just 'getting on with it' and not worrying about what tomorrow
brings. At this point, Americans risk another clash with China on the
issue of democracy. Americans naturally applaud when Governor Patten
calls for more democracy. China has no intention of concerning itself
with "more democracy" for Hong Kong, and this riles Americans. Neither
the American media nor spokesman for the American government are
inclined to overlook any opportunity to plug for more democracy; and every
American speech or news comment only serves to raise the Chinese
temperature.
March 31, 1993, US Department of State
Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 14 (April 5, 1993) :217.
1HA Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific
Rim," Report to Congress 1992, Department of
Defense, 9.
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E STRENGTHENING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND HONG
KONG
In an attempt to strengthen the relationship between America and
Hong Kong, and to protect its interests in the colony, the United States
enacted The United States - Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. The bill,
introduced by Senator Mitch McConnell, is the first time the United States
has considered policy toward Hong Kong as a separate and distinct issue.
The policy is designed to reflect the increased interests the United States
has in Hong Kong. According to Senator McConnell:
The bill will lay out, for the first time, a comprehensive, coherent
framework for formalizing our relationship with Hong Kong. The act,
which is based on the Joint Declaration, addresses U.S. policy toward
Hong Kong in five areas: bilateral ties, Hong Kong participation in
multilateral organizations, commerce, transportation, and cultural
and education.
The U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act encourages the administration,
the Congress, and the private sector groups to begin to deepen
existing relations and seek new relations with Hong Kong in these
five areas.
The act also ensures that Hong Kong status in U.S. law will not
be changed solely as a result of reversion to Chinese sovereignty. . .
The more the United States recognizes and respects the
autonomy of Hong Kong while it remains under British rule, the less
China will see such policies as an affront to PRC sovereignty after
1997.
Finally, establishment of a clear policy will boost confidence
in Hong Kong and stem emigration. It will show that the United
States, the leader of the international community, is willing to
support Hong Kong now and after 1997. 1
The congress was determined to have its say no matter how much its
irritates the Chinese. The State Department issued a press release
1
"Hong Kong's Reversion to China and Implications
for U.S. Policy," Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. One
Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, April 2,
1992. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office) 1992.
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pointing out the conflicts inherent in the United States - Hong Kong Policy
Act of 1992:
The Chinese maintain that Hong Kong is a matter between China and
Britain before July 1, 1997. After that, it say, it will purely be
China's internal affair. Beijing argues that U.S. adoption of domestic
legislation on Hong Kong constitutes unjustified interference in
China's internal affairs and violates universally acknowledged norms
governing international relations.
The U.S. government has informed the PRC that the Hong Kong
Policy Act is fully consistent with the spirit of the Joint
Declaration. The intern of the Act is to make changes in U.S. law
needed to deal with changes in Hong Kong's status in 1997. The Act
aims to assist in the continuation of prosperity and confidence in
Hong Kong by enabling the U.S. to respect Hong Kong's special
status. 1
Critics of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 see this
bill as an attempt by America to micromanage foreign policy and to
legislate morality for another country. If taken at face value, the act
could prove to be a confidence building tool slowing emigration and
encouraging American investment within the colony. Unfortunately, the
perceived interference by the United States into China's domestic affairs
has primarily a negative impact on Hong Kong. It is cited as another
example of excessive American interference in the internal affairs of
China.
1 A Report To Congress On Conditions In Hong Kong
As Of March 31, 1993, by the State Department, as
required by Sec. 301 of the United States - Hong




In 1979, the Labour Foreign Secretary under Prime Minister James
Callaghan, Dr. David Owen, sent the Governor of Hong Kong, Murray
MacLehose, to Beijing to discuss the future of the colony. The Chinese did
not recognize MacLehose' position as they did not recognize the colonial
status of Hong Kong. The Chinese leadership felt it was their place to
take the initiative on the Hong Kong issue; two years later, the Chinese
Premier, Hua Guo Feng, visited British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
in London and the process of returning Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty
finally began.
Speculation as to the motives behind the start of negotiations lean
toward the British ridding "themselves of political and defense
commitments". 1 From within the colony, a resolution of the situation was
sought in order to preserve civil order and to maintain financial stability.
With British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to China, in
1982, came the answer to the main question: the end of British rule would
come with the expiration of the lease on 30 June, 1997. In 1984, Great
Britain and China negotiated the terms of and, in 1985, signed a "Joint
Declaration". That document provided a timetable for the turnover of the
colony. Additionally, it contained a pledge that the capitalist economy of
Hong Kong and its social system would be preserved for fifty years (till
2047) under Chinese sovereignty. According to Michael Yahuda comments
on the Joint Doctrine:
It has so far facilitated development of the territory. Yet it
involved British acceptance of the vague and untested formula of
'one country, two systems' as a basis for a legal commitment to
uphold in the future 'a high degree of autonomy' for a former colony
under the authority of a communist regime which has an unenviable
record of continually violating its own constitutional norms-as was
to be shown again in the 1989 Tiananmen massacre less than five
years later. . . Although the contrast in the negotiating styles of
Britain and China has attracted some attention, little has been
1 Leonard Rayner, "Hong Kong - Prospects for
Democracy," The Round Tab le. 1992, 229-235.
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devoted to the extraordinary implications of the Joint Declaration of
1984: first, the Chinese communists entrusted the British to
continue to administer Hong Kong and to have exclusive
responsibility in preparing the territory for autonomy; and second,
at Chinese insistence, Hong Kong representation was specifically
excluded from the negotiating process, although by the terms of the
negotiations the people of the territory would be developing
representative institutions. But perhaps the most striking novelty
of the negotiating process was the undertaking of these two
countries of such different histories and political cultures to
cooperate for thirteen years about delicate and uncertain matters as
if oblivious to the record of volatility of the Chinese communist
regime and to the responsibility of the radical change in the external
environment. 1
Because the document was so ambigious, there have been conflicting
interpretations of the Joint [Declaration by both the British and the
Chinese from the very beginning. The document called for the writing of a
constitution, by China, for the post-1997 government; this would become
the Basic Law. China interpreted this to mean that it would write the
rules for Hong Kong before 1997 and the Basic Law would then outline the
way the system would be maintained until 2047. Britain would continue
to be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong until the turnover in
1997. A Joint Liaison Group (JLG) was established to implement the
declaration. The two governments were committed to a "smooth transfer
of government in 1997". At the request of the Chinese, a Land Commission
was established to monitor land sales and income distribution.
The British plan was tor direct elections to a Legislative Council in
a transition to democracy. Groups within Hong Kong even prepared to form
political parties. China denounced these changes saying they were not
consistent with the Joint Declaration; the British also claimed the
Chinese were not honoring the Joint Declaration.
1 Michael Yahuda, "Hong Kong's future: Sino-British
negotiations, perceptions, organization and
political culture," International Affairs 69,2
(1993), 245-266. The text of the Joint Declaration
is appended as Appendix A to this thesis.
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Each side, could in good faith, say they were honoring the agreement.
The British believed they had governed the colony in a democratic style
and any move toward a democracy was justifiable within the parameters
of the Joint Declaration. In preventing specific democratic reforms from
occurring, the Chinses did not feel they had reneged on the terms of the
agreement, after all, the commitment was to maintain the current
system.
B. BASIC LAW
In 1986, a drafting committee was established to work on a mini-
constitution for Hong Kong; there were to be a total of 59 members, 23
were to be from Hong Kong. A consultative committee of 180 members
was to assist in the process The first draft was published in 1988; in
February of 1989, a second draft was released.
Although these drafts followed in general terms the requirements
of the Joint Declaration, the prevailing constitution of Hong Kong
was colonial and authoritarian in tone, even though in practice many
of its executive powers were little used, or applied in a relatively
tolerant fashion that might not be applied under the authority of the
Chinese Communist party. In the absence of democratic institutions
in Hong Kong, these had to be negotiated into the Basic Law. But
conversely, since the British were committed to 'mirror-imaging'
the Basic Law, democratic change within Hong Kong was limited to
the starting point which the Basic Law provided for 1997. Indeed, by
1988 it was professed British policy to seek convergence with the
Chinese proposals for the SAR in the hope that a 'through train'
would conduct Hong Kong smoothly from British to Chinese
sovereignty in 1997. 1
Arguments over the Basic Law resulted form the student
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and the demonstrations of support
that followed in Hong Kong. Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the
Party, on July 11, 1989, met with the Hong Kong Basic Law Drafting
1 Michael Yahuda, "Hong Kong's future: Sino-British
negotiations, perceptions, organization and
political culture," International Affairs 69,2
(1993), 245-266.
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Committee (BLDC) and the Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC). He
warned the Hong Kong people not to interfere with China, in other words,
to refrain from acts which threaten the communist system of China. A
tone had been set for Hong Kong, and their confidence in the "one country,
two systems" plan China had promised them was shaken.
Consultation on the Basic Law was continued for three months per
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress indicating no
willingness to revise the draft Basic Law that had been released in
February 1989. It is important to remember, the Basic Law was drafted
by the British and the Chinese; there was no input from the citizens of
Hong Kong.
Following the promulgation of the Basic Law, no one realistically
had any doubt that one day soon the Chinese would again control Hong Kong.
The document, once signed, started the process of Chinese control which
would climax in 1997. The initial reaction of the citizens of Hong Kong
was one of resignation and relief, but there was a demonstration by some
2,000 students who burned copies of the Basic Law.
The Basic Law was aporoved by the National People's Congress of
China in March 1990. Few changes had been made to the draft; twenty, not
eighteen, of the first post-1997 legislature would be directly elected.
Also, the two-track voting system had been modified; the end result for
Hong Kong was not going to be democracy. Polls, taken after the Basic
Law was approved, showed sharp differences of opinion regarding the
Basic Law and its provisions for an autonomous Hong Kong.
An important aspect of the document was a ban on "subversion" that
the Chinese wrote into the document as a result of the Tiananmen Square
student protests. This raised fears that China would renege on the range
of freedoms Hong Kong needed to maintain its capitalist economy. The
government of Hong Kong neither debated the nonsubversion rule publicly
nor formed a consensus on the range of behaviors that were considered
permissible. Instead, Hong Kong seemed to adjust itself to a quiet
acceptance to the hand that had been dealt. Governor David Wilson was
looked upon as a lackey, bowing submissively to the fiat of Beijing.
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C. GOVERNOR PATTEN'S ATTEMPTED MODIFICATIONS
Once the Basic Law was signed, the Chinese pushed for more control
of Hong Kong. On the contrary, the British Prime Minister, John Major,
appointed a new governor for Hong Kong, Christopher Patten, a former
chairman of the Conservative' party. Patten began openly proposing a
faster pace for democratic changes for Hong Kong, as with the selection of
members of the local legislature. (Governor Patten found some loopholes
in the Basic Law and began using them to his advantage. An example of
this is with the selection of a legislator by the leaders of the various
interest groups; Patten planed to extend the vote to every worker within
the industry.) Beijing did not take this well. Suggestions came from
China that the Basic Law could be "scattered to the wind" if the British
governor continued to push for democratic reform. It was rumored that
China might even attempt to gam control of Hong Kong before 1997. There
was, and still is (mid-1993) support for many of Patten's proposals from
within Hong Kong. Many citizens feel as if they were left out of the
negotiations between the British and the Chinese and now want to be
heard.
As the British continue to negotiate with the Chinese over specific
details on the turnover of Hong Kong, few immediate material British
interests are involved. (The economic benefits the British receive from
Hong Kong are concentrated in a few trading companies and individuals. In
Hong Kong, British goods compete on the free market with goods from
other countries. Some funds are received as pensions for retired Hong
Kong civil servants living in Britain. There are also dividends and profits
for British shareholders in Hong Kong firms.)
What is to be gained by British efforts to effect a long term change
in Hong Kong before 1997 is that if the turnover is successful and Hong
Kong continues to operate its capitalist economy under China, the British
will continue to enjoy the feeling of goodwill in the Asian theater, and
specifically, the Asian market. If things do not go well, the standing of
the British in the region will fall. All of this has immediate effect on
American interests in Hong Kong. British and Americans are in the same
boat in Hong Kong. What the Chinese do to harm the British will also harm
the Americans. But a common hostility to Chinese repression measures
will not dampen British and American commercial competition. As the
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new Chinese regime goes into effect, the respective rivals will compete
like cats and dogs for their own commercial advantage.
As of the writing of this thesis (May 1993), negotiations over the
Governor Patten's proposal to further democratize the territory, by
increasing the number of elected seats open to direct voting in the 1994-
95 election, was still causing problems between Britain and China. Qian
Qichen, was quoted by the China Daily as saying, in reference to the on-
going negotiations: "The job in Hong Kong now is to implement agreements
reached between China and Britain and not to launch "political reforms'". 1
1
"Chinese President Zemin Warns Britain on
Previous.
.
." United Press International, Beijing,
May 18, 1993.
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V. CHINA IN HONG KONG - ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS AFTER 1997
What will happen in Hong Kong after 01 July, 1997? The events
could unfold in any number of ways: China could allow Hong Kong to
continue on its free market way and allow the Special Administrative
Region of Hong Kong to manage the dynamic economy that it has developed.
Or, China could attempt to influence the internal running of Hong Kong,
going against the provisions of the Basic Law, and micromanage the region
right out of its place in the world's global economy. Or Hong Kong could be
weighed down by the rampant corruption and the requirement to buy
political influence that exists now within China. China might even
prosper by allowing Hong Kong to do what Hong Kong does best: to make
money through intelligent, long term investments in the PRC and
throughout the world. Or, dnspite the rapid growth of China's economy and
the recent commitment of the Chinese leadership to continue economic
growth within China, the ideological and political principles that China
adheres to could cause a slowing down of the economic drive that exists
in Hong Kong. China is in the driver's seat and it will be China that makes
all the decisions.
The most likely scenarios foreseen in this discussion are supported
with information from A Fragile Relationship: The United States and
China Since 1972 . by Harry Harding. In his book recent, Harding outlines
five possible scenarios for the future of the relationship between the
United States and China. Three are described here in order to "paint a
picture" of what the future may hold for the future relationship between
China, to include Hong Kong, and the United States.
A. DANGER OF CLOSING TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD-WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO
THE UNITED STATES?
The first scenario, a worst case scenario, illustrates the possibility
of China closing to the outside world :
The realization that Hong Kong's autonomy will be limited, and that
the exercise of local democracy will be restricted, has produced a
serious crisis of confidence in the future of Hong Kong, especially
among younger professionals, managers, and intellectuals. This
uncertainty has been reflected in a mounting outflow of human
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capital and financial resources from the territory. Moreover, as the
1997 deadline approaches, Hong Kong is likely to experience more
difficulties. The brain drain and the flight of capital will increase.
The morale of the civil service could well decline, especially in such
sensitive sectors as the police, and corruption and influence-
peddling could grow. Inflation could surge if large amounts of labor
and capital leave the territory, and the growth rate could slow if
wages and interest rates rise as a result. If the economy and
political situation deteriorated sufficiently, there could be serious
social unrest in Hong Kong, before or after the British left the
territory. At some point, instability in Hong Kong could trigger
direct Chinese military intervention. . .
But as the crisis of confidence in Hong Kong began to affect
American businesses operating in the territory, Hong Kong began to
attract greater attention in the United States. . . Greater
deterioration of the situation in Hong Kong would therefore have a
deleterious impact on Sino-American relations, conceivably as
severe as a confrontation between Taiwan and the mainland. Any use
of Chinese military force against Hong Kong, even to quell serious
social unrest, would most likely be seen as a serious violation of
human rights in the territory and an occasion for another round of
American economic and diplomatic sanctions against China. . . In so
delicate a period, the imposition of such punitive measures would
evoke a harsh Chinese' response and would almost certainly trigger a
grave confrontation beiween China and the United States. 1
This pessimistic scenario is considered unlikely. If it were to
occur, Hong Kong would sutler immeasurably. One of the most serious
effects would be the continuation of the brain drain, currently seen as one
of the most serious problems facing Hong Kong. As some of the young,
educated elite leave Hong Kong for Canada, Australia, and the United
States, the concern arises that social stability within the colony will be
undermined. (It is not the number of people that are choosing to leave the
colony, it is the quality that is of concern.) According to Wong Siu-lun,
there are three reasons for this: "First, it is said that the brain drain will
lead to a depletion of the "functional core" of the economy. Second, it is
felt that the widespread desire to leave will engender a doomsday
1 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; The United
States and China Since 1972 . (Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institute, 1992), 317-318.
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syndrome and result in a state of anomie. Third, it is alleged that
desertion by the elites will create a crisis of legitimacy and an erosion of
the moral basis of authority." 1
Wong Siu-lun points out the "yuppie" refugees "exit" as a means to
express dissatisfaction and that the people of Hong Kong are currently
experiencing a sense of political powerlessness and feel they have little
or no influence on their government.
Kerry Dumbaugh and Michael Ipson write: "The emigration issue
largely stems from the lack of confidence about China, its intentions, and
its prospects for social, economic, and policy stability, particularly since
the June 1989 crackdown and its repressive aftermath throughout the
country. That crackdown, and the subsequent hardening of China's position
on political issues, has made many fearful that Chinese leaders either
will not honor or will interpret selectively their commitments to Hong
Kong's "high degree of autonomy" after 1997." 2
The Chinese leadership does not fear the dooms-day consequences of
the emigration of the Hong Kong elite. The best and brightest will still
remain at home in Hong Kong. For every one that leaves, there is a vacancy
that will be filled by a migrant from the China mainland that is eager to
take his place.
B. Chinese Reform
The second scenario is a more optimistic, but still unlikely,
scenario. Harding titles it: " A Renewed Partnership in China's Reform;"
the situation is one :
1 Wong Siu-lun, "Emigration and Stability in Hong
Kong," Asian Survey Vol. XXXII, No. 10 (10 October,
1992):918-933.
2 Kerry Dumbaugh and Michael Ipson, "The United
States and Hong Kong's Future: Promoting Stability
and Growth," National Committee, China Policy
Series, No. Three, June 1990. This was a summary
report of a conference convened by The National
Committee on U.S. -China Relations, Inc. with the
support of The Henry Luce Foundation and The
Hotung Institute of International Studies, held
March 29-30, 1990 in Hong Kong.
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. . . that seemed to be emerging in the mid-1 980's. The prerequisite
for such a development would be the renewal of both economic
reform and political liberalization, coupled with a more sympathetic
reassessment of the mass demonstrations that produced the
Tiananmen crisis. On that basis, the remaining U.S. sanctions
imposed on Peking after the Tiananmen crisis would be lifted. The
U.S. government would extend enthusiastic moral and material
support for China's domestic development programs by relaxing
controls over the export of advanced technology to Peking, and even
extending a modest economic and technical assistance program.
American business would increase investment in China, trade would
continue to grow, and academic and cultural exchanges between the
two countries would flourish. China would show renewed interest
not only in American capital and technology, but also in Western
values and institutions And, while not forming a strategic
alignment against a common enemy, Peking and Washington might
assume more cooperative postures on various global and regional
issues. 1
In this situation, Hong Kong would prosper. As the markets in China
expanded, imports and expons in and out of China through Hong Kong
would grow. Confidence in me PRC would rise and foreign investment
would certainly increase, not only in Hong Kong but throughout China as
well. Hong Kong people would enjoy the freedom to continue to do what
they do best: make lots of money; all would benefit.
C. A Strained Relationship
Harry Harding concludes that the most likely scenario for the
relationship between China and the United States would be that of a:
. . . strained relationship, characterized by a complex mixture of
conflict, competition, and cooperation. In contrast to U.S.-China
relations in the mid-1 980's, there would be no overriding sense of
common purpose, whether that be a strategic alignment against a
mutual adversary or a shared commitment to Chinese reform. But
despite strained relations there would also be less chance of
1 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; The United
States and China Since 1972 . (Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institute, 1992), 307.
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military conflict, more intense economic interaction, and more
frequent diplomatic cooperation on regional and global issues than
would occur in an ouuight confrontation. 1
This being the likely scenario, Hong Kong will probably be able to
continue to grow and expand economically. Problems will occur but will
be settled in discussions with the Chinese government. 'Growing pains'
under China and uncertainty about the future will cause some to leave the
colony (as is occurring now). But, in the end, Hong Kong would remain the
role model for every market oriented city in China and join madly in the
pursuit of profit.
1 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship; The United
States and China Since 1972
.
(Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institute, 1992), 319.
5 2
VI. SUMMARY/CONCLUSION
The importance of the American consulate General in Hong Kong
increased by leaps and bounds. Our defense attache in Hong Kong became
our most important diplomatic post on the China coast. And as mainland
China gradually opened its aoors to economic reform and the outside
world, Hong Kong was the sole avenue to approach and understanding. The
old commercial importance of Hong Kong to the British was magnified a
hundred fold by its political importance to the United States and the free
world.
Now the cold war is over, and we have come full circle. Hong Kong
will retain much of its prosperity, and it holds promise for continuing
much of its entrepot trade to China. But it is no longer the sole avenue of
approach to China. Americans can operate in Manchuria, in Beijing and
China's oil fields of the Far West, in Shanghai, Canton and all the Special
Economic Zones. Americans can have their representatives and exchange
students all over the vast expanses of Chinese territory. We no longer
need Hong Kong in the way we needed it in the days of the cold war.
What happens to Hong Kong is now up to the Chinese. The old British
regime is allowed fifty years for an acceptable transition and whatever
happens, one can expect the same degree of initiative and enterprise on
the part of adventurous Americans who will seek their fame and fortune in
Hong Kong or elsewhere in China. They will have to take their chances
against their competition, and insist only on most favored nation and
equality of commercial opportunity as they enjoyed in the days before the
late and unlamented cold war.
This thesis has shown the development of American interests in
Hong Kong and suggests that with the ending of the cold war new policies
will have to be adapted for the protection and promotion of those
interests.
Originally, Hong Kong was ceded to the British as a prize in the
Opium War. It was developed less as a political colony than as an entrepot
for British trade with the Chinese Empire. Americans shared the benefits
of foreign trade and always insisted on equality of commercial
opportunity or most favored nation status in the matter of all trade
between China and the outside world. At first, foreign trade did not
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amount to much in dollars and cents and the major share always went to
the British traders.
Hong Kong was important to the British. Of Hong Kong, Chinese
journalist Tsang Ki-fan said, "This is the only Chinese society that for a
brief span of 100 years, lived through an ideal never realized at any time
in the history of Chinese society - a time when no man had to live in fear
of the midnight knock on the door." 1 But Hong Kong was not that important
to the Americans. The headquarters for American trade with China were
in Manila and Shanghai, while Hong Kong was the headquarters for the
British competition.
American diplomacy centered in Beijing. Few Americans liked Hong
Kong or shared the sentimental attachments between Britain and Hong
Kong. British and Americans together suffered the barbs of anti-
imperialism in China and the growing resentment of the Chinese
nationalist against the unequal treaties. British and Americans together
felt the sting of Japanese aggression in World War II.
It was only with the advent of the cold war that Hong Kong became a
monumental common interest of Britain, the United States, and the entire
free world. Trade was no longer the great asset of Hong Kong. Hong Kong
was the listening post for Communist China, the sole point d'appui for the
free World to the Asian component of the communist conspiracy to rule
the world. Hong Kong assumed a defense or security or intelligence-
gathering importance that it had never known.
1 William McGurn, Perfidious Albion: The
Abandonment of Hong Kong, 1997, (Washington, DC:
Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), p. 134.
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APPENDIX A
JOINT DECLARATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China have
reviewed with satisfaction the friendly relations existing between the two
Governments and peoples in recent years and agreed that a proper
negotiated settlement of the question of Hong Kong, which is left over from
the past, is conducive to the maintenance of the prosperity and stability of
Hong Kong and to the further strengthening and development of the
relations between the two countries on a new basis. To this end, they have,
after talks between the delegations of the two Governments, agreed to
declare as follows:
1. The Government of i he People's Republic of China declares that to
recover the Hong Kong area (including Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the
New Territories, hereinafter referred to as Hong Kong) is the common
aspiration of the entire Chinese people, and that it has decided to resume
the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997.
2. The Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will restore
Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997.
3. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares
that the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding
Hong Kong are as follows:
(1) Upholding national unity and territorial integrity and
taking account of the history of Hong Kong and its realities, the
People's Republic of China has decided to establish, in accordance
with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's
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Republic of China, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region upon
resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong.
(2) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be
directly under the authority of the Central People's Government of
the People's Republic of China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and
defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's
Government.
(3) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be
vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power,
including that of final adjudication. The laws currently in force in
Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.
(4) The Government o\ the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive will
be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the
results of elections or consultations to be held locally. Principal
officials will be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region for appointment by the Central
People's Government. Chinese and foreign nationals previously
working in the public and police services in the government
departments of Hong Kong may remain in employment. British and
other foreign nationals may also be employed to serve as advisers or
hold certain public posts in government departments of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
(5) The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong
will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and
freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of
assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence,
of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of
religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of enterprises,
legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be
protected by law.
(6) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain
the status of a free port and a separate customs territory.
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(7) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain
the status of an international financial centre, and its markets for
foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures will continue. There
will be free flow of capital. The Hong Kong dollar will continue to
circulate and remain freely convertible.
(8) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will have
independent finances. The Central People's Government will not levy
taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(9) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may
establish mutually beneficial economic relations with the United
Kingdom and other countries, whose economic interests in Hong Kong
will be given due regard.
(10) Using the name o\ "Hong Kong, China", the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop
economic and cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements
with states, regions and relevant international organizations. The
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on
its own issue travel documents for entry into and exit from Hong
Kong.
(11) The maintenance o\' public order in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region will be the responsibility of the Government
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(12) The above-stated basic policies of the People's Republic of
China regarding Hong Kong and the elaboration of them in Annex I to
this Joint Declaration will be stipulated, in a Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China,
by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China,
and they will remain unchanged for 50 years.
4. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the
People's Republic of China declare that, during the transitional period
between the date of the entry into force of this Joint Declaration and 30
June 1997, the Government o\' the United Kingdom will be responsible for
the administration of Hong Kong with the object of preserving its economic
prosperity and social stability; and that the Government of the People's
Republic of China will give its cooperation in this connection.
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5. The Government or the United Kingdom and the Government of the
People's Republic of China declare that, in order to ensure a smooth
transfer of government in 1997, and with a view to the effective
implementation of this Joint Declaration, a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group
will be set up when this Joint Declaration enters into force; and that it will
be established and will function in accordance with the provisions of
Annex 11 to this Joint Declaration.
6. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the
People's Republic of China declare that land leases in Hong Kong and other
related matters will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of
Annex III to this Joint Declaration.
7. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the
People's Republic of China agree to implement the preceding declaration
and the Annexes to this Joint Declaration.
8. This Joint Declaration is subject to ratification and shall enter into
force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, which shall
take place in Beijing before 30 June 1985. This Joint Declaration and its
Annexes shall be equally binding.
Done in duplicate at Beijing on 1984 in the English and Chinese
languages, both texts being equally authentic.
(Signed)
For the Government of




For the Government of
the People's Republic of China
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ANNEX I
ELABORATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
OF ITS BASIC POLICIES REGARDING
HONG KONG
The Government of the People's Republic of China elaborates the basic
policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong as set out in
paragraph 3 of the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong as follows:
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China stipulates in Article
31 that "the state may establish special administrative regions when
necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions
shall be prescribed by laws enacted by the National People's Congress in
the light of specific conditions." In accordance with this Article, the
People's Republic of China shall, upon the resumption of the exercise of
sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997, establish the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. The
National People's Congress oi the People's Republic of China shall enact and
promulgate a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Basic Law) in
accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China,
stipulating that after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region the socialist system and socialist policies shall not
be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and that Hong
Kong's previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain unchanged for
50 years.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be directly under
the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic
of China and shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Except for foreign and
defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's
Government, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested
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with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that
of final adjudication. The Central People's Government shall authorise the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to conduct on its own those
external affairs specified in Section XI of this Annex.
The government and legislature of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through
consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's
Government. Principal officials (equivalent to Secretaries) shall be
nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region and appointed by the Central People's Government. The legislature
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by
elections. The executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall be
accountable to the legislature.
In addition to Chinese, English may also be used in organs of
government and in the courts in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region.
Apart from displaying the national flag and national emblem of the
People's Republic of China, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
may use a regional flag and emblem of its own.
1 I
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e., the common law,
rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law)
shall be maintained, save for any that contravene the Basic Law and
subject to any amendment by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
legislature.
The legislative power ol the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
shall be vested in the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. The legislature may on its own authority enact laws in accordance
with the provisions of the Basic Law and legal procedures, and report them
to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record.
Laws enacted by the legislature which are in accordance with the Basic
Law and legal procedures shall be regarded as valid.
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The laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the
Basic Law, and the laws previously in force in Hong Kong and laws enacted
by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature as above.
II 1
After the establishmen of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, the judicial system previously practiced in Hong Kong shall be
maintained except for those changes consequent upon the vesting in the
courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the power of final
adjudication.
Judicial power in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be
vested in the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The
courts shall exercise judicial power independently and free from any
interference. Members of the judiciary shall be immune from legal action
in respect of their judicial functions. The courts shall decide cases in
accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
and may refer to precedents in other common law jurisdictions.
Judges of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region courts shall be
appointed by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region acting in accordance with the recommendation of an independent
commission composed of heal judges, persons from the legal profession
and other eminent persons. Judges shall be chosen by reference to their
judicial qualities and may be recruited from other common law
jurisdictions. A judge may only be removed for inability to discharge the
functions of office, or for misbehavior, by the chief executive of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region acting in accordance with the
recommendation of a tribunal appointed by the chief judge of the court of
final appeal, consisting of not fewer than three local judges. Additionally,
the appointment or removal of principal judges (i.e. those of the highest
rank) shall be made by the chief executive with the endorsement of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature and reported to the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. The
system of appointment and removal of judicial officers other than judges
shall be maintained.
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The power of final judgment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall be vested in the court of final appeal in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, which may as required invite judges from other
common law jurisdictions to sit on the court of final appeal.
A prosecuting authority of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall control criminal prosecutions free from any interference.
On the basis of the system previously operating in Hong Kong, the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall on its own
make provision for local lawyers and lawyers from outside the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region to work and practise in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.
The Central People's Government shall assist or authorise the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Government to make appropriate
arrangements for reciprocal juridical assistance with foreign states.
IV
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, public servants previously serving in Hong Kong in all government
departments, including the police department, and members of the
judiciary may all remain in employment and continue their service with
pay, allowances, benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than
before. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall
pay to such persons who retire or complete their contracts, as well as to
those who have retired before 1 July 1997, or to their dependents, all
pensions, gratuities, allowances and benefits due to them on terms no less
favourable than before, and irrespective of their nationality or place of
residence.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may
employ British and other foreign nationals previously serving in the public
service in Hong Kong, and may recruit British and other foreign nationals
holding permanent identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region to serve as public servants at all levels, except as heads of major
government departments (corresponding to branches or departments at
Secretary level) including the police department, and as deputy heads of
some of those departments. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
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Government may also employ British and other foreign nationals as
advisers to government departments and, when there is a need, may
recruit qualified candidate's from outside the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region to professional and technical posts in government
departments. The above shall be employed only in their individual
capacities and, like other public servants, shall be responsible to the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Government.
The appointment and promotion of public servants shall be on the
basis of qualifications, experience and ability. Hong Kong's previous system
of recruitment, employment, assessment, discipline, training and
management for the public service (including special bodies for
appointment, pay and conditions of service) shall, save for any provisions
providing privileged treatment for foreign nationals, be maintained.
V
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall deal on its own
with financial matters, including disposing of its financial resources and
drawing up its budgets and its final accounts. The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall report its budgets and final accounts to the
Central People's Government for the record.
The Central People's Government shall not levy taxes on the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall use its financial revenues exclusively for its own purposes and
they shall not be handed over to the Central People's Government. The
systems by which taxation and by which there is accountability to the
legislature for all public expenditure, and the system for auditing public
accounts shall be maintained.
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VI
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the
capitalist economic and trade systems previously practised in Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall decide its
economic and trade policies on its own. Rights concerning the ownership of
property, including those relating to acquisition, use, disposal, inheritance
and compensation for lawful deprivation (corresponding to the real value
of the property concerned, freely convertible and paid without undue
delay) shall continue to be protected by law.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall retain the status of
a free port and continue a free trade policy, including the free movement
of goods and capital. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on
its own maintain and develop economic and trade relations with all states
and regions.
The Hong Kong Speciil Administrative Region shall be a separate
customs territory. It may participate in relevant international
organizations and international trade agreements (including preferential
trade arrangements), such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
and arrangements regarding international trade in textiles. Export quotas,
tariff preferences and othei similar arrangements obtained by the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region shall be enjoyed exclusively by the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall have authority to issue its own certificates of
origin for products manufactured locally, in accordance with prevailing
rules of origin.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may, as necessary,
establish official and semi-official economic and trade missions in foreign
countries, reporting the establishment of such missions to the Central
People's Government for the record.
VII
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall retain the status of
an international financial centre. The monetary and financial systems
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previously practised in Hong Kong, including the systems of regulation and
supervision of deposit taking institutions and financial markets, shall be
maintained.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may decide
its monetary and financial policies on its own. It shall safeguard the free
operation of financial business and the free flow of capital within, into and
out of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. No exchange control
policy shall be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures shall continue.
The Hong Kong dollar as the local legal tender, shall continue to
circulate and remain freely convertible. The authority to issue Hong Kong
currency shall be vested in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government
may authorise designated banks to issue or continue to issue Hong Kong
currency under statutory authority, after satisfying itself that any issue of
currency will be soundly based and that the arrangements for such issue
are consistent with the object of maintaining the stability of the currency.
Hong Kong currency bearing references inappropriate to the status of Hong
Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China
shall be progressively replaced and withdrawn from circulation.
The Exchange Fund shall be managed and controlled by the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government, primarily for regulating the
exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar.
VIII
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain Hong
Kong's previous systems of shipping management and shipping regulation,
including the system for regulating conditions of seamen. The specific
functions and responsibilities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government in the field of shipping shall be defined by the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Government on its own. Private
shipping businesses and shipping-related businesses and private container
terminals in Hong Kong ma) continue to operate freely.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be authorised by
the Central People's Government to continue to maintain a shipping
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register and issue related certificates under its own legislation in the name
of "Hong Kong, China".
With the exception of foreign warships, access for which requires the
permission of the Central People's Government, ships shall enjoy access to
the ports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance
with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
IX
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the status
of Hong Kong as a centre of international and regional aviation. Airlines
incorporated and having then principal place of business in Hong Kong and
civil aviation related businesses may continue to operate. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall continue the previous system of civil
aviation management in Hong Kong, and keep its own aircraft register in
accordance with provisions laid down by the Central People's Government
concerning nationality marks of aircraft. The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall be responsible on its own for matters of
routine business and technical management of civil aviation, including the
management of airports, the provision of air traffic services within the
flight information region of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
and the discharge of other responsibilities allocated under the regional air
navigation procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organisation.
The Central People's Government shall, in consultation with the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Government, make arrangements
providing for air services between the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region and other parts of the People's Republic of China for airlines
incorporated and having their principal place of business in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and other airlines of the People's Republic of
China. All Air Service Agreements providing for air services between other
parts of the People's Republic of China and other states and regions with
stops at the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and air services
between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other states and
regions with stops at other parts of the People's Republic of China shall be
concluded by the Central People's Government. For this purpose, the
Central People's Government shall take account of the special conditions
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and economic interests of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government. Representatives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government may participate as members of delegations of the
Government of the People's Republic of China in air service consultations
with foreign governments concerning arrangements for such services.
Acting under specific authorisations from the Central People's Government,
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may:
-renew or amend Air Service Agreements and arrangements previously in
force; in principle, all such Agreements and arrangements may be renewed
or amended with the rights contained in such previous Agreements and
arrangements being as far as possible maintained;
-negotiate and conclude nev Air Service Agreements providing routes for
airlines incorporated and having their principal place of business in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and rights for overflights and
technical stops; and
-negotiate and conclude provisional arrangements where no Air Service
Agreement with a foreign state or other region is in force.
AN scheduled air services to. from or through the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region which do not operate to, from or through the
mainland of China shall be regulated by Air Service Agreements or
provisional arrangements referred to in the paragraph.
The Central People's Government shall give the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government the authority to:
-negotiate and conclude with other authorities all arrangements concerning
the implementation of the above Air Service Agreements and provisional
arrangements;
-issue licences to airlines incorporated and having their principal place of
business in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:
-designate such airlines under the above Air Service Agreements and
provisional arrangements; and
-issue permits to foreign airlines for services other than those to, from or
through the mainland of China.
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The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the
educational system previously practised in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government shall on its own decide policies
in the fields of culture, education, science and technology, including policies
regarding the educational system and its administration, the language of
instruction, the allocation ot funds, the examination system, the system of
academic awards and the recognition of educational and technological
qualifications. Institutions of all kinds, including those run by religious and
community organisations, may retain their autonomy. They may continue
to recruit staff and use teaching materials from outside the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. Students shall enjoy freedom of choice of
education and freedom to pursue their education outside the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.
XI
Subject to the principle that foreign affairs are the responsibility of
the Central People's Government, representatives of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government may participate, as members of
delegations of the Government of the People's Republic of China, in
negotiations at the diplomatic level directly affecting the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region conducted by the Central People's Government. The
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own, using the name
"Hong Kong, China", maintain and develop relations and conclude and
implement agreements with states, regions and relevant international
organisations in the appropriate fields, including the economic, trade,
financial and monetary, shipping, communications, tourism, cultural and
sporting fields. Representatives of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government may participate, as members of delegations of the
Government of the People's Republic of China, in international organi-
sations or conferences in appropriate fields limited to states and affecting
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, or may attend in such other
capacity as may be permitted by the Central People's Government and the
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organisation or conference concerned, and may express their views in the
name of "Hong Kong, China'. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
may, using the name "Hong Kong. China", participate in international
organisations and conference-; not limited to states.
The application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
international agreements to which the People's Republic of China is or
becomes a party shall be decided by the Central People's Government, in
accordance with the circumstances and needs of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, and after seeking the views of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government. International agreements to
which the People's Republic of China is not a party but which are imple-
mented in Hong Kong may remain implemented in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. The Central People's Government shall, as
necessary, authorise or assist (he Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government to make appropriate arrangements for the application to the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of other relevant international
agreements. The Central People's Government shall take the necessary
steps to ensure that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall
continue to retain its status in an appropriate capacity in those
international organisations of which Hong Kong participates in one capacity
or another. The Central People's government shall, where necessary,
facilitate the continued participation of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region in an appropriate capacity in those international
organisations in which Hong Kong is a participant in one capacity or
another, but of which the People's Republic of China is not a member.
Foreign consular and other official or semi-official missions may be
established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with the
approval of the Central People's Government. Consular and other official
missions established in Hong Kong by states which have established formal
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China may be
maintained. According to the circumstances of each case, consular and
other official missions of states having no formal diplomatic relations with
the People's Republic of China may either be maintained or changed to
semi-official missions. States not recognised by the People's Republic of
China can only establish non-governmental institutions.
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The United Kingdom may establish a Consulate-General in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
XII
The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall lie the responsibility of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government. Military forces sent by the Central
People's Government to be stationed in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region for the purpose of defence shall not interfere in the
internal affairs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Expenditure for these military forces shall be borne by the Central People's
Government.
XIII
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government shall
protect the rights and freedoms of inhabitants and other persons in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region according to law. The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Government shall maintain the rights and
freedoms as provided for (he laws previously in force in Hong Kong,
including freedom of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of
association, to form and join trade unions, of correspondence, of travel, of
movement, of strike, of demonstration, of choice of occupation, of academic
research, of belief, inviolability of the home, the freedom to marry and the
right to raise a family freely
Every person shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to
the courts, representation in the courts by lawyers of his choice, and to
obtain judicial remedies. Every person shall have the right to challenge the
actions of the executive in the courts.
Religious organisations and believers may maintain their relations
with religious organisations and believers elsewhere, and schools, hospitals
and welfare institutions run by religious organisations in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and those in other parts of the People's
Republic of China shall be based on the principles of non-subordination,
non-interference and mutual respect.
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The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force.
XIV
The following categories of persons shall have the right of abode in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and, in accordance with the law
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, be qualified to obtain
permanent identity cards issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government, which state their right of abode:
-all Chinese nationals who were born or who have ordinarily resided in
Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region for a continuous period of 7 years or more, and
persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of such Chinese
nationals;
- all other persons who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong before or
after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for
a continuous period of 7 years or more and who have taken Hong Kong as
their place of permanent residence before or after the establishment of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and persons under 21 years of
age who were born of such persons in Hong Kong before or after the
establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:
-any other persons who had the right of abode only in Hong Kong before
the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
The Central People's Government shall authorise the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government to issue, in accordance with the law,
passports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China to all Chinese nationals who hold permanent identity
cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and travel docu-
ments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China to all other persons lawfully residing in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. The above passports and documents shall
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be valid for all states and regions and shall record the holder's right to
return to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
For the purpose of traveling to and from the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region may use travel documents issued by the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government, or by other competent authorities of
the People's Republic of China, or of other states. Holders of permanent
identity cards of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may have
this fact stated in their travel documents as evidence that the holders have
the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of persons
from other parts of China shall continue to be regulated in accordance with
the present practice.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government may apply
immigration controls on entiy. stay in and departure from the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region by persons from foreign states and regions.
Unless restrained by law. holders of valid travel documents shall be
free to leave the Hong Kone Special Administrative Region without special
authorisation.
The Central People's Government shall assist or authorise the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region Government to conclude visa abolition
agreements with states or regions.
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ANNEX II
SINO-BRITLSH JOINT LIAISON GROUP
1. In furtherance of then common aim and in order to ensure a
smooth transfer of government in 1997, the Government of the People's
Republic of China and the Government of the United Kingdom have agreed
to continue their discussions in a friendly spirit and to develop the
cooperative relationship which already exists between the two
Governments over Hong Kong with a view to the effective implementation
of the Joint Declaration.
2. In order to meet the requirements for liaison, consultation and the
exchange of information, the two Governments have agreed to set up a
Joint Liaison Group.
3. The functions of the Joint Liaison Group shall be:
(a) to conduct consultations on the implementation of the Joint
Declaration;
(b) to discuss matters relating to the smooth transfer of
government in 1997;
(c) to exchange information and conduct consultations on such
subjects as may be agreed by the two sides.
Matters on which there is disagreement in the Joint Liaison Group
shall be referred to the two Governments for solution through
consultations.
4. Matters for consideration during the first half of the period
between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group and 1 July
1997 shall include:
(a) action to be taken by the two Governments to enable the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to maintain its economic
relations as a separate customs territory, and in particular to ensure
the maintenance of Hong Kong's participation in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Multifibre Arrangement and
other international arrangements; and
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(b) action to be taken by the two Governments to ensure the
continued application of international rights and obligations affect-
ing Hong Kong.
5. The two Governments have agreed that in the second half
of the period between the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group
and 1 July 1997 there will be need for closer cooperation, which will
therefore be intensified during that period. Matters for
consideration during this second period shall include:
(a) procedures io be adopted for the smooth transition in
1997:
(b) action to assist the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region to maintain and develop economic and cultural
relations and conclude agreements on these matters with states,
regions and relevant international organisations.
6. The Joint Liaison Group shall be an organ for liaison and not an
organ of power. It shall play no part in the administration of Hong Kong or
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Nor shall it have any
supervisory role over that administion. The members and supporting staff
of the Joint Liaison Group shall only conduct activities within the scope of
the functions of the Joint Liaison Group.
7. Each side shall designate a senior representative, who shall be of
Ambassadorial rank, and tour other members of the group. Each side may
send up to 20 supporting staff.
8. The Joint Liaison Group shall be established on the entry into force
of the Joint Declaration. From 1 July 1988 the Joint Liaison Group shall
have its principal base in Hong Kong. The Joint Liaison Group shall
continue its work until 1 January 2000.
9. The Joint Liaison Group shall meet in Beijing, London and Hong
Kong. It shall meet at least once in each of the three locations in each year.
The venue for each meeting shall be agreed between the two sides.
10. Members of the Joint Liaison Group shall enjoy diplomatic
privileges and immunities as appropriate when in the three locations.
Proceedings of the Joint Liaison Group shall remain confidential unless
otherwise agreed between the two sides.
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11. The Joint Liaison Group may by agreement between the two sides
decide to set up specialist sub-groups to deal with particular subjects
requiring expert assistance.
12. Meetings of the Joint Liaison Group and sub-groups may be
attended by experts other than the members of the Joint Liaison Group.
Each side shall determine the composition of its delegation to particular
meetings of the Joint Liaison Group or sub-group in accordance with the
subjects to be discussed and the venue chosen.
13. The working procedures of the Joint Liaison Group shall be
discussed and decided upon by the two sides within the guidelines laid




The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the
People's Republic of China have agreed that, with effect from the entry into
force of the Joint Declaration, land leases in Hong Kong and other related
matters shall be dealt with m accordance with the following provisions:
1. All leases of land granted or decided upon before the entry into
force of the Joint Declaration and those granted thereafter in accordance
with paragraphs 2 or 3 of this Annex, and which extend beyond 30 June
1997, and all rights in relation to such leases shall continue to be
recognised and protected under the law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
2. All leases of land granted by the British Hong Kong Government not
containing a right of renewal that expire before 30 June 1997, except short
term tenancies and leases for special purposes, may be extended if the
lessee so wishes for a period expiring not later than 30 June 2047 without
payment of an additional piemium. An annual rent shall be charged from
the date of extension equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the
property at that date, adjusted in ^tep with any changes in the rateable
value thereafter. In the case of old schedule lots, village lots, small houses
and similar rural holdings, where the property was on 30 June 1984 held
by, or, in the case of small houses granted after that date, the property is
granted to, a person descended through the male line from a person who
was in 1898 a resident of an established village in Hong Kong, the rent
shall remain unchanged so long as the property is held by that person or
by one of his lawful successors in the male line. Where leases of land not
having a right of renewal rxpire after 30 June 1997, they shall be dealt
with in accordance with the relevant land laws and policies of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
3. From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June
1997, new leases of land may be granted by the British Hong Kong
Government for terms expiring not later than 30 June 2047. Such leases
shall be granted at a premium and nominal rental until 30 June 1997, after
which date they shall not require payment of an additional premium but
an annual rent equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the
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property at that date, adjusted in step with changes in the rateable value
thereafter, shall be charged.
4. The total amount of new land to be granted under paragraph 3 of
this Annex shall be limited to 50 hectares a year (excluding land to be
granted to the Hong Kong Housing Authority for public rental housing)
from the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997.
5. Modifications of the conditions specified in leases granted by the
British Hong Kong Government may continue to be granted before 1 July
1997 at a premium equivalent to the difference between the value of the
land under the previous conditions and its value under the modified
conditions.
6. From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June
1997, premium income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government
from land transactions shall, after deduction of the average cost of land
production, be shared equally between the British Hong Kong Government
and the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. All
the income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government, including the
amount of the above-mentioned deduction, shall be put into the Capital
Works Reserve Fund for the financing of land development and public
works in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Government's share of the premium income shall be deposited in banks
incorporated in Hong Koiu' and shall not be drawn on except for the
financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong in
accordance with the provisions o\ paragraph 7 (d) of this Annex.
7. A Land Commission shall be established in Hong Kong immediately
upon the entry into force of the Joint Declaration. The Land Commission
shall be composed of an equal number of officials designated respectively
by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the
People's Republic of China together with necessary supporting staff. The
officials of the two sides shall be responsible to their respective
governments. The Land Commission shall be dissolved on 30 June 1997.
The terms of reference of the Land Commission shall be:
(a) to conduct consultations on the implementation of this
Annex:
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(b) to monitor observance of the limit specified in paragraph 4
of this Annex, the amount of land granted to the Hong Kong Housing
Authority for public rental housing, and the division and use of
premium income referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex;
(c) to consider md decide on proposals from the British Hong
Kong Government for increasing the limit referred to in paragraph 4
of this Annex;
(d) to examine proposals for drawing on the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government's share of premium income
referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex and to make
recommendations to the Chinese side for decision.
Matters on which there is disagreement in the Land Commission
shall be referred to the Government of the United Kingdom and
Government of the People's Republic of China for decision.
8. Specific details regarding the establishment of the Land Commission
shall be finalised separately by the two sides through consultations.
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MEMORANDA
(To Be Exchanged Between the Two Sides)
MEMORANDUM
In connection with the Joint Declaration of the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government
of the People's Republic of China on the question of Hong Kong to be signed
this day, the Government of the United Kingdom declares that, subject to
the completion of the necessary amendments to the relevant United
Kingdom legislation:
(a) All person-, who on 30 June 1997 are, by virtue of a
connection with Hong Kong, British Dependent Territories citizens
(BDTCs) under the law in force in the United Kingdom will cease to be
BDTCs with effect from I July 1997, but will be eligible to retain an
appropriate status which, without conferring the right of abode in
the United Kingdom, will entitle them to continue to use passports
issued by the Government of the United Kingdom. This status will be
acquired by such persons only if they hold or are included in such a
British passport issued before 1 July 1997, except that eligible
persons born on or after 1 January 1997 but before 1 July 1997 may
obtain or be included in such a passport up tO 31 December 1997.
(b) No person will acquire BDTC status on or after 1 July
1997 by virtue of a connection with Hong Kong. No person born on or
after 1 July 1997 will acquire the status referred to as being
appropriate in sub-paragraph (a).
(c) United Kingdom consular officials in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and elsewhere may renew and replace
passports of persons mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) and may also
issue them to persons, born before 1 July 1997 of such persons, who
had previously been included in the passport of their parent.
(d) Those who have obtained or been included in passports
issued by the Government of the United Kingdom under
subparagraphs (a) and (c) will be entitled to receive, upon request,
British consular services and protection when in third countries.
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MEMORANDUM
The Government of the People's Republic of China has received the
memorandum from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland dated 1984.
Under the Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, all Hong
Kong Chinese compatriots, whether they are holders of the "British
Dependent Territories citizen •;' Passport" or not, are Chinese nationals.
Taking account of the historical background of Hong Kong and its
realities, the competent authorities of the Government of the People's
Republic of China will, with effect from 1 July 1997, permit Chinese
nationals in Hong Kong who were previously called "British Dependent
Territories citizens" to use travel documents issued by the Government of
the United Kingdom for the purpose of travelling to other states and
regions.
The above Chinese nationals will not be entitled to British consular
protection in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other parts
of the People's Republic of China on account of their holding the above-
mentioned British travel documents.
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APPENDIX B




Oct. 5. \W2 To set forth the policv of th^ United States with respect to Hong [S.1731]
Kong, <n id for other purposes.
Be it enacted In/ the Semite and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SI IORT TITLE.
This Art m<iv be cited <is the "United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of
1992".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS.
The Congress makes the following findings and declarations:
(1) Th.' Congress recognizes that under the 1984 SinoBritish Joint
Declaration:
(A) The People's Republic of China and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland have agreed that the People's
Republic of China will resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong
Kong on lulv 1, 1997. Until that time, the United Kingdom will be
responsible for the administration of Hong Kong.
(B) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People s Republic of China, beginning on July 1, 1997, will continue to
enjoy a high degree ot autonomy on all matters other than defense and
foreign affairs.
(C) There is provision for implementation of a "one country, two
systenW policy, under which Hong Kong will retain its current
lifestyle and legal, social, and economic systems until at least the year
2047.'
(D) The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region will be constituted by elections, and the provisions of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Intern, itional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as
applied to Hong Kong, shall remain in force.
(E) Provision is made for the continuation in force of agreements
implemented as of June 30, 1997, and for the ability of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region to conclude new agreements either on its
own 01 with the assistance of the Government of the Feople's Republic
of China.
(2) The Congress declares its wish to see full implementation of the
provisions of toe loint Declaration.
(3) Th.' President has announced his support for the policies and
decisions refle. ted in the loint Declaration.
(4) Hong Kong plays an important role in today's regional and world
economy. This role is reflected in strong economic, cultural, and other ties with
the United Stales that give the United States a strong interest in the continued
vitality, prosperity, and stability of Hong Kong.
(5) Support for democratization is a fundamental principle of United
States foreign policy. As such, it naturally applies to United States policy
toward Hong Kong. This will remain equally true after June 30, 1997.
(6) The human rights of the people of Hong Kong are of great
importance to the United States and are directly relevant to United States
interests in Hong Kong. A fully successful transition in the exercise of
sovereignty over Hong Kong must safeguard human rights in and of themselves.
Human rights also serve as a basis for Hong Kong's continued economic
prosperity.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
For pin poses of this Act-
(1) the term Hong Kong means, prior to July 1, 1997, the British
Dependent Territory of Hong Kong, and on and after July 1, 1997, the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China;
(2) the term "Joint Declaration
1
' means the Joint Declaration of the
Government oi the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong
Kong, done at Beijing i^n December 19, 1984; and
(3) tht term "laws of the United States" means provisions of law
enacted by the - ongress.
TITLE I--POLICY
SEC. 101. BILATERAL TIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
HONG KONG
It is the sense of the Congress that the following, which are based in
part on the relevant provisions of the Joint Declaration, should be the policy of
the United Stales with respect to its bilateral relationship with Hong Kong:
(1) The United States should play an active role, before, on, and after
July 1, 1997, in maintaining Hong Kong's confidence and prosperity, Hong Kong's
role as an international financial center, and the mutually beneficial ties
between the people of the United States and the people of Hong Kong.
(2) The United States should actively seek to establish and expand
direct bilateral ties and agreements with Hong Kong in economic, trade,
financial, monetary, aviation, shipping, communications, tourism, cultural,
sport, and other appropriate areas.
(3) The United States should seek to maintain, after June 30, 1997, the
United States consulate-general in Hong Kong, together with other official and
semi-official organizations, such as the United States Information Agency
American Library.
(4) The United States should invite Hong Kong to maintain, after June
30, 1997, its official and semi-official missions in the United States, such as the
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Hong Kong Economic & rrade Office, the Office of the Hong Kong Trade
Development ' Council, <in<.1 the Hung Kong Tourist Association. The United
States should invite Hong Kong to open and maintain other official or semi-
official missions to represent Hong Kong in those areas in which Hong Kong is
entitled to maintain relations on its own, including economic, trade, financial,
monetary, avi.ition, shipping, communications, tourism, cultural, and sport
areas.
(5) Tht United States should recognize passports and travel documents
issued after (une 30, l cW, by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(6) Tlit resumption by the People's Republic of China of the exercise of
sovereignty over Hong Kong after June 30, 1997, should not affect treatment of
Hong Kong residents who apply for visas to visit or reside permanently in the
United States, -o long as such treatment is consistent with the Immigration and
Nationality Act.




It is the sense of the Congress that the following, which are based in
part on the relevant provisions of the Joint Declaration, should be the policy of
the United States with respect to Hong Kong after June 30, 1997:
(1) The United States should support Hong Kong's participation in all
appropriate multilateral conferences, agreements, and organizations in which
Hong Kong is eligible to participate.
(2) The United States should continue to fulfill its obligations to Hong
Kong under international agreements, so long as Hong Kong reciprocates,
regardless of whether the People's Republic of China is a party to the
particular international agreement, unless and until such obligations are
modified or tei minated in accordance with law.
(3) Tht United States should respect Hong Kong's status as a separate
customs territory, and as a contracting party to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, whether or not the People's Republic of China participates
in the latter organization
SEC. 103. COMMERCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND HONG KONG.
It is the sense of the Congress that the following, which are based in
part on the relevant provisions of the Joint Declaration, are and should continue
after June 30, 1997, to be the policy of the United States with respect to
commerce between the United States and Hong Kong:
(1) The United States should seek to maintain and expand economic and
trade relations with Hong Kong and should continue to treat Hong Kong as a
separate territory in economic and trade matters, such as import quotas and
certificates of i >rigin.
(2) The United States should continue to negotiate directly with Hong
Kong to conclude bilateral economic agreements.
(3) Tht United States should continue to treat Hong Kong as a territory
which is fully autonomous from the United Kingdom and, after June 30, 1997,
should treat Hong Kong as a territory which is fully autonomous from the
People's Republic of China with respect to economic and trade matters.
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(4) The United States should continue to grant the products of Hong
Kong ,nondisi riminatory trade treatment (commonly referred to as 'most-
favored-nation status ) by virtue of Hong Kong's membership in the General
Agreement on rariffs and Trade.
(5) The United States should recognize certificates of origin for
manufactured goods issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
(6) The United States should continue to allow the United States dollar
to be freely exchanged with the Hong Kong dollar.
(7) United States businesses should be encouraged to continue to operate
in Hong Kong, in accordance with applicable United States and Hong Kong law.
(8) The United States should continue to support access by Hong Kong to
sensitive technologies controlled under the agreement of the Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (commonly referred to. as
"COCOM") foi so long as the United States is satisfied that such technologies
are protected ti mi improper use or export.
(9) The I nited States should encourage Hong Kong to continue its efforts
to develop a framework which provides adequate protection for intellectual
property right
(10) The United States should negotiate a bilateral investment treaty
directly with I long Kong, in consultation with the Government of the People's
Republic of CI" ma.
(11) The change in the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong should
not affect ownership in any property, tangible or intangible, held in the United
States by any Hong Kong person.
SEC. 104. TRANSPORTATION.
It is the sense of the Congress that the following, which are based in
part on the' relevant provisions of the Joint Declaration, should be the policy of
the United States after June 30, 1997, with respect to transportation from Hong
Kong:
(1) Reiognizing Hong Kong's position as an international transport
center, the United States should continue to recognize ships and airplanes
registered in Hong Kong and should negotiate air service agreements directly
with Hong Kong.
(2) Tht United States should continue to recognize ships registered by
Hong Kong.
(3) Umted States commercial ships, in. accordance with applicable
United States and Hong Kong law, should remain free to port in Hong Kong.
(4) Tht United States should continue to recognize airplanes registered
by Hong Kone in accordance with applicable laws of the People's Republic of
China.
(5) The United States should recognize licenses issued by the Hong Kong
to Hong Kong airlines.
(6) The United States should recognize certificates issued by the Hong
Kong to United States air carriers for air service involving travel to, from, or
through Hong Kong which does not involve travel to, from, or through other
parts of the People's Republic of China.
(7) The United States should negotiate at the appropriate time
directly with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, acting under
authorization from the Government of the People's Republic of China, to renew
or amend all air service agreements existing on June 30, 1997, and to conclude new
air service agreements affecting all flights to, from, or through the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region which
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do not invoke travel to, from, or through other parts of the People's Republic of
China.
(8) The United States should make every effort to ensure that the
negotiations described in paragraph (7) lead to procompetitive air service
agreements.
SEC. ins. CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES,
It is the sense of the Congress that the following, which are based in
part on the relevant provisions of the joint Declaration, are and should continue
after June 30, 1 c>97, to be the policy of the United States with respect to cultural
and education<il exchanges with Hong Kong:
(1) The United States should seek to maintain and expand United
States-Hong Rung relations and exchanges in culture, education, science, and
academic research. The United States should encourage American
participation in bilateral exchanges with Hong Kong, both official and
unofficial.
(2) The United States should actively seek to further United States-
Hong Kong cultural relations <w)d promote bilateral exchanges, including the
negotiating anil concluding of appropriate agreements in these matters.
(3) Hong Kong should be accorded separate status as a full partner under
the Fulbright \cademic Exchange Program (apart from the United Kingdom
before July I, 1997, and apart from the People's Republic of China thereafter),
with the continuation or establishment of a Fulbright Commission or func-
tionally equivalent mechamsm-
(4) Tlie United States should actively encourage Hong Kong residents to
visit the United States on nonimmigrant visas for such purposes as business,
tourism, education, and scientific and academic research, in accordance with
applicable United States and Hong Kong laws.
(5) Upon the request of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, the
Librarian of C ongress, acting through the Congressional Research Service,
should seek to expand educational and informational ties with the Council.
TITL E II--THE STATUS OF HONG KONG
IN UNITED STATES LAW
SEC. 201. CONTINUED APPLICATION OF UNITED
STATES LAW.
(a) IN GENERAL. --Notwithstanding any change in the exercise of
sovereignty over Hong Kong, the laws of the United States shall continue to
apply with respect to Hong Kong, on and after July I, 1997, in the same manner
as the laws of ihe United States were applied with respect to Hong Kong before
such date unless otherwise expressly provided by law or by Executive' order
under section 2<>2.
(b) IN "i ERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. — For all purposes, including
actions in anv court in the United States, the Congress approves the
continuation in force on and after July 1, 1997, of all treaties and other
international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered into
before such date between the United States and Hong Kong, or entered into
before such date between the United States and the United Kingdom and
applied to Hong Kong, unless or u:,-.~ terminated in accordance with law. If in
carrying out tins title, the President determines that Hong Kong is not legally
8 5
competent to carry out its obligations under any such treaty or other
international agreement, or that the continuation of Hong Kong's obligations or
rights under am such treaty or other international agreement is not
appropriate under the circumstances, such determination shall be reported to
the Congress in accordance with section 301.
SEC. 202. PRESIDENTIAL ORDER.
(a) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.- On or after July 1, 1997,
whenever the President determines that Hong Kong is not sufficiently
autonomous to justify treatment under a particular law of the United States, or
any provision thereof, different fromthat accorded the People's Republic of
China, the President may issue an Executive order suspending the application
of section 201(<i ) to such law or provision of law.
(b) FACTOR FOR CONSIDERATION. - In making a determination
under subsection (,i) with respect to the application of a law of the United
States, or any provision thereof, to Hong Kong, the President should consider
the terms, obligations, and expectations expressed in the Joint Declaration with
respect to Hon).- Kong.
(C) PL BLICATION IN FEDERAL REGISTER. — Any Executive order
issued under subsection O) shall be published in the Federal Register and shall
specify the law or provision of law affected by the order.
(d) TERMINATION OF SUSPENSION. - An Executive order issued
under subsection (,i) may be terminated by the President with respect to a
particular law or provision of law whenever the President determines that
Hong Kong ha.1 - regained sufficient autonomy to justify different treatment under
the law or pro\ ision oi law in question. Notice of any such termination shall be
published in the Federal Register. SEC. 203. RULES AND REGULATIONS.
The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as
the President may deem appropriate to carry out this Act.
SEC. 204. CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS.
In carrying out Otis title, the President shall consult appropriately
with the Congress.
TITLE III--REPORTING PROVISIONS
SEC 3(U. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Not later than March 31, 1993, March 31, 1995, March 31, 1997, March
31, 1998, March 31, 1999, and March 31, 2000, the Secretary of State shall
transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on conditions in Hong
Kong of interest to the United States. This report shall cover (in the case of the
initial report) I he period since the date of enactment of this Act or (in the case
of subsequent reports) the period since the most recent report pursuant to this
section and sh.ill describe
(1) significant developments in United States relations with Hong
Kong, including a description of agreements that have entered into force
between the United States <md Hong Kong;
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(2) other matters, including developments related to the change in the
exercise of sovereignty oxer Hong Kong, affecting United States interests in
Hong Kong or United States relations with Hong Kong;
(3) the nature and extent of United States-Hong Kong cultural,
education, scientific, and academic exchanges, both official and unofficial;
(4) the laws of the United States with respect to which the
application of section 201(a) has been suspended pursuant to section 202(a) or
with respect to which such a suspension has been terminated pursuant to section
202(d), and the reasons for the suspension or termination, as the case may be;
(5) treaties cMM.\ other international agreements with respect to which
the President has made a determination described in the last sentence of section
201(b), and the reasons for each such determination;
(6) significant problems in cooperation between Hong Kong and the
United States in the area oi export controls;
(7) the levelopment of democratic institutions in Hong Kong; and
(8) the nature and extent of Hong Kong's participation in multilateral
forums.
SEC. 302. SEPARATE PART OF COUNTRY REPORTS.
Whenever a report is transmitted to the Congress on a country-by-
country basis there shall be included in such report, where applicable, a
separate subreport on Hong Kong under the heading of the state that exercises
sovereignty over Hong Kong. The reports to which this section applies include
the reports transmitted under-
(1) sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(relating to human rights);
(2) section 1 <S 1 <)( the Trade Act of 1974 (relating to trade barriers); and
(3) section 2202 ot the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (relating to
economic policy and trade practices).
Approved October 5, 1992.
LEGISLATIVE H1STORY--S. 1731:
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 138 (1992):
May 2 1 considered and passed Senate.
Aug. 1 , considered and passed House, amended.
Sept. 1". Senate concurred in House amendments.
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